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ABSTRACT 
 
In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to 
political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their 
takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that 
politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of 
getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically 
connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political 
expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms’ connections, not easily 
replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.  
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1. Introduction 
[…] Cnooc Ltd. on Tuesday withdrew its $18.5 billion takeover bid for California energy 
firm Unocal Corp., saying it could not overcome resistance from politicians in Washington 
[...] (Source: The Washington Post, August 3, 2005). 
Corporate political strategies and the political connections they provide are associated with firms’ 
investment decisions. Taking into account the fact that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are 
among the most important and economically meaningful corporate investments (Harford and Li, 
2007), we choose the takeover market setting for an empirical examination of two different 
corporate political strategies, contributions to political action campaigns (PACs) and lobbying. A 
plethora of prior studies has established that, on the one hand, political connections can increase 
firm value (see, for instance, Akey, 2015; Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2010; Faccio, 
2006; Hill et al., 2013), be a useful tool used for managing political risk (e.g., Kim et al., 2016), 
lead to lower cost of bank loans (Houston et al., 2014), and allow firms to obtain procurement 
contracts from the government (Brogaard et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
there is also evidence that political connections between firm insiders and politicians are 
associated with non-value maximizing management behavior (e.g., see, Chaney et al., 2011; 
Firth et al., 2011). Collectively, the evidence from prior studies can be interpreted as consistent 
with the notion that connected firms’ valuation includes an idiosyncratic “political” component, 
which differentiates them relative to otherwise similar firms that are not politically active. 
 In spite of the research in the area that spans finance and political sciences and the 
increasing awareness about the prominence of political connections in the corporate world, there 
is still limited evidence of their impact on particular aspects of the takeover process and 
outcomes, and how the market for corporate control assesses valuation implications of political 
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connections.
1
 Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2008) provide a theoretical argument that firms which 
face heavy regulation are more likely to target political strategies which influence regulatory 
action. We conjecture that mergers are a highly regulated process that can be influenced by 
politicians. There is some limited, early evidence (Coate et al., 1990) that the two primary 
merger regulators (i.e., the FTC and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division) make 
decisions based on political concerns. 
2
 However, there is a lot more evidence, both academic 
(Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989; Mallette and Spagnola, 1994; Udawatta, 2016)
3
 and anecdotal,
4
 
that political interference with proposed mergers of local target firms can either result in, or 
coincide with, a challenge by the State Attorney General’s (SAG) office. We hypothesize that 
politicians’ ability to either directly, or indirectly influence SAG offices and antitrust agencies to 
                                                 
1
 The scant evidence linking political connections and takeovers, which implies that politics may complicate M&A 
deals, is primarily concerned with the banking and energy sectors only. For example, see Chong et al. (2006) for a 
study on the wealth effects of forced bank mergers due to an intervention of the Malaysian government in 1999 and 
Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014) who examine how firms use election campaign contributions to politicians as a 
method of influencing regulatory merger approvals in the energy sector. Additionally, Dinc and Erel (2013) show 
that governments in European Union countries intervene in merger attempts and deter bids from foreign bidders due 
to economic nationalism. 
2
 More recently, Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze (2016) suggest political connections and legal challenges allow 
firms to overcome regulatory hurdles. However, their evidence is based on acquiring firms.  
3
 According to Mallette and Spagnola (1994), legislators often enact takeover laws to limit the adverse effects of 
merger and acquisition activity on the economies of their states. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) examined 40 
antitakeover bills passed by various state legislatures and showed that almost seventy-five percent were introduced 
on behalf of at least one large firm headquartered in the state. Udawatta (2016) describes State Attorney General’s 
offices can urge Congress to pass laws that affect mergers, as in the case of Connecticut Attorney General Richard 
Blumenthal did, when he urged Congress to ban tax-inversion mergers on June 25, 2002. 
4
 For example, take the case of the Fairview Health Services, the Twin Cities’ second-largest hospital and clinic 
group, which was targeted in a takeover attempt launched by South Dakota-based Sanford Health. The proposed 
Fairview-Sanford merger could transfer control of the University of Minnesota Medical Center, a major research 
and teaching hospital, to an out-of-state company with no history in Minneapolis area health care. On April 19, 2013, 
the Nonprofit Quarterly (see “The Merger That Might Have Been: Sanford Health and Fairview Health Services”, 
by Michael Wyand)  describes how public suspicion and politicians intent on slowing, if not stopping, the merger, 
led to Sanford Health’s decision to cease merger discussions. Indeed, several Minnesota state legislators introduced 
a bill (HF 1755, see https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?b=house&f=HF1755&ssn=0&y=2013) to slow or 
stop the merger. In the Fairview-Sanford proposed merger, powerful community and/or business leaders recruited 
politicians in voicing concerns with proposed mergers. Star Tribune, on April 4, 2013, states that University of 
Minnesota General Counsel, Mark Rotenberg had raised local concerns against the proposed merger and also 
indicated that he had very strong support from Gov. Mark Dayton. Not surprisingly, the proposed merger met a 
challenge by the State Attorney General’s office that eventually resulted in Sanford pulling out of the deal. (see, 
“Minn. AG to investigate Sanford's proposed takeover of Fairview. Attorney General Lori Swanson raises concerns, 
plans hearings over possible joining of two health care giants”, by Tony Kennedy and Jeremy Olson, Star Tribune 
staff writers, April 4, 2013). 
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investigate potential bids is particularly pertinent in the case of target firms with strong ties to 
local politicians. Given that politicians’ careers are more tightly intertwined with local firms and 
constituencies they draw support from, we surmise that they will be more likely to show interest 
in, or possibly interfere with, proposed takeovers involving such firms.  Our aim is to shed light 
on the following important, yet unanswered, questions: Do political connections established via 
two distinctly different corporate political strategies (i.e., PAC contributions and lobbying) affect 
the probability of target firms being taken over? Do political connections delay the M&A process 
when an offer arrives? Finally, do they have an impact on the size of takeover premium offered?  
We acknowledge the fact that firms rarely disclose the involvement of politicians in an 
M&A transaction and generally would avoid stating whether ties to politicians are established 
with the goal of obtaining a specific M&A outcome. Nevertheless, there is ample anecdotal 
evidence that politicians often display a propensity to get engaged in corporate takeovers 
involving constituent firms.
5
 In this study, we contend and provide evidence of a mutually 
beneficial relationship between politicians and firms: on the one hand, politicians’ incentives 
may provide motivation to interfere in an M&A process that involves firms they are connected to; 
on the other hand, corporations may wish to use political connections to serve their own interests 
(i.e., deter from acquisition bids in our case).  
                                                 
5
 BBC news, on May 26, 2014, reported that “US drugs giant Pfizer has withdrawn its £55 a share, £69bn takeover 
bid for UK pharmaceutical firm AstraZeneca…Following the AstraZeneca board's rejection of the proposal, Pfizer 
announces that it does not intend to make an offer... AstraZeneca had fiercely resisted the bid, backed by some 
politicians.” Another characteristic example of political intervention for deterring an M&A deal is presented in The 
Economist, June 1, 2013: “...American politicians decide whether to approve the sale for $4.7 billion ($7.1 billion 
including debt) announced on May 29th of Smithfield Foods, the world’s largest pork producer, to Shuanghui 
International, a giant Chinese meat company…. So, will America’s politicians do likewise [as done by Chinese 
government for a sale of a large share of Shuanghui to an investor group including Goldman Sachs] with the 
acquisition of Smithfield? Or will they end up scuppering the deal, as happened with CNOOC’s bid for Unocal, an 
oil company, in 2005, and the attempt to buy the operator of several American ports by Dubai Ports World in 
2006?...”. 
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There are several motivations for politicians to interfere with the takeover market. First, 
politicians have incentives to continue receiving contributions and donations from corporations, 
which could be used to pursue their goals. For instance, reflecting the importance of 
contributions for politicians, Snyder (1990) shows that the amount of contributions sourcing 
from special interest groups is positively associated with the probability of a legislator winning 
an election. Second, some politicians may be interested in a career in the industry (see, for 
example, Faccio (2006) for some evidence of former politicians serving in the boards of directors 
of listed corporations). Therefore, keeping a relationship with firms via contributions and 
donations might be useful toward this direction. Third, politicians connected to target firms are 
concerned about whether they would continue to receive contributions and support by the new 
merged company once the takeover is completed. Finally, politicians may be concerned about 
losing corporate support from their region if they appear to encourage deals wherein distant 
acquirers absorb local firms they are connected with. Most importantly, such M&A deals could 
also seriously diminish the politicians’ reputation if they would imply the loss of local workforce 
and potential voter support. Indeed, in that case they could also lose contributions from 
individuals who donate to politicians that could assist firms in industries important for their 
district (Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni, 2012).  
In line with the above arguments, and in support of the notion that politicians have an 
incentive to interfere with corporate takeovers, in our empirical analysis we initially establish the 
existence of a strong link between politicians’ ties to firms active in the takeover market and both 
their chances of getting re-elected, as well as their ability to raise large sums of money in the 
future. On the one hand, politicians with ties to takeover targets face lower probability of re-
election. Additionally, having ties to target firms of failed takeover attempts seems to improve 
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politicians’ fortunes: future cash contributions from corporate PACs increase when politicians 
are connected to target firms that survived takeover bids. On the other hand, politicians with ties 
to acquirers generally enjoy better prospects of re-election and can raise significantly larger 
amounts of money in the future, especially when they are connected to bidders involved in 
completed deals. We also show that employment in the district decreases following takeovers of 
public firms located in the same district, further reducing the re-election chances of local 
politicians. Thus, our evidence implies that politicians’ career concerns can motivate them to 
interfere in the M&A activities of the firms they are connected to.   
Corporations, in turn, may also try to exploit the connected politicians’ concern about the 
loss of support from their constituents.
6
 For example, corporations wishing to deter their 
competitors from pursuing takeover strategies may need politicians’ assistance in the form of 
invoking regulatory hurdles. In this respect, and as mentioned before, there is both academic (see, 
Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2004, 2008) and anecdotal evidence that politicians tied to target 
firms may influence the antitrust agencies to investigate particular aspects of a transaction and 
encourage them to launch a formal legal challenge.
 
Thus, based on the above we contend that 
politicians’ and corporations’ interests in the takeover market can affect different aspects of 
M&A deals. In particular, target firms’ political connections can complicate deals by influencing 
the probability of completing a bid and the time to completion of the deal.  
We expect that, ceteris paribus, firms with PAC contributions and/or lobbying 
expenditures are less likely to be taken over. Additionally, we predict that target firms with 
political connections are associated with longer time to completion of the takeover deal. Finally, 
it should be noted that our hypothesis is based on the premise that it is not the dollar amount 
                                                 
6
 In general, corporations have a tendency to use their connections with politicians in order to affect implemented 
rules. For instance, Hochberg et al. (2009) find that corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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spent on corporate political strategies per se that is important and should drive any association, 
but the implied ties with politicians which affect takeover outcomes. Prior studies (e.g. 
Bombardini and Trebbi, 2008; Milyo et al., 2000; Ovtchinnikov et al., 2014) have argued that the 
true cost of firms’ political activities is higher than what is publicly observable. Our study is the 
first to highlight that political strategies can be important in several facets of the takeover market.   
We also hypothesize that, in addition to affecting the probability of being taken over and 
deal completion time, target political connections can have an impact on the size of the takeover 
premium. Corporate political participation over the past few decades can be viewed as the result 
of a path-dependent learning process (Drutman, 2011) wherein, as firms gain more experience, 
they expand the scope of their political activities beyond an initial focus on risk management to 
creating future growth opportunities by influencing political outcomes (e.g., legislative action). 
Thus, in the context of takeovers, target firms’ political strategies can enhance growth 
opportunities of the merged firm and should offer a valuable competitive advantage to the firm 
that possesses them, which should translate into a higher takeover premium. Additionally, the 
ties between target firms and politicians may not only complicate the takeover process but are 
also likely to increase the bargaining power of target firm’s management and allow it to 
negotiate a higher takeover premium. Finally, the takeover premium should be more pronounced 
when the target firm’s political strategies provide connections that acquirers cannot easily 
establish on their own. Specifically, we hypothesize that the premium paid for a politically active 
target firm will be higher if the bidder does not pursue similar political strategies with the target 
firm.
7
   
                                                 
7
 One could argue that a bidder could simply emulate the target firm’s PAC contributions in order to obtain the 
benefit of its corporate political strategies without needing to pay the cost of buying an entire firm via an acquisition. 
However, this argument is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First of all, the ties to politicians developed 
through corporate political strategies are established gradually and become effective after a long time, so this is not 
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Based on the above we expect, ceteris paribus, a positive relation between target firms’ 
PAC contributions (or lobbying) and takeover premium when the acquiring firm is not making 
PAC contributions (or does not engage in any lobbying activities). Conversely, if target firms’ 
corporate political strategies are easy to replicate by bidding firms, then they should not 
command higher premiums in takeover deals.  
To identify political connections through contributions to PACs, we begin with the four 
political contribution measures of Cooper et al. (2010) plus a measure of the total contributions 
by a firm over the last five years. Nevertheless, to establish a stronger link between political 
contributions and M&A outcomes, we focus on political contributions to members of the specific 
congressional committee that oversees the industry in which the contributing firm operates. In 
fact, these are the politicians who are better positioned to introduce bills that can benefit firms 
they get support from.
 
This allows us to provide a more direct evidence of the effects of political 
contribution strategies on merger outcomes.
8
  
We find strong support for the view that corporate political strategies have a profound 
impact on M&A transactions. Using a sample of US listed firms over the period 1992-2011, we 
provide robust evidence of a significantly negative association between political contributions 
and the probability of a firm being acquired. In economic terms, being politically connected 
reduces the probability of being acquired from 3.52% to 1.28%, i.e., a 63.56% decrease. Our 
results remain robust when controlling for potential endogeneity bias.
9
 Consistent with political 
                                                                                                                                                             
an easy process for the bidder to emulate. Second, the target firm’s corporate political strategy is just one of the 
target firm’s assets the bidder is likely to be interested in, yet it may also have an impact on all other assets when the 
bidder evaluates the synergies from the deal. 
8
 In a robustness analysis, we also use the political contribution variables of Cooper et al. (2010). The results remain 
unchanged.  
9
 We perform three tests to alleviate endogeneity concerns. First, we use a conditional logit estimation (Bena and Li, 
2014) where we estimate the likelihood for each firm relative to a matched group of firms by firm and industry 
characteristics. Second, we consider the issue under the two-stage model setting. We use both the two-stage 
instrumental variable (IV) and Heckman’s (1979) selection models. Third, we also conduct a difference-in-
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connections complicating deals, we also provide clear evidence that political contributions delay 
the M&A process increasing the time to completion. Moreover, we find a significantly positive 
relation between political contributions and target firm takeover premium. This effect is 
completely reversed when the bidder already has corporate political strategies in place that are 
similar to those of the target firm. This finding is consistent with the notion that target firms’ 
connections established via PAC contributions can act as facilitators of growth opportunities for 
which the bidder is willing to pay a higher premium, provided that the bidder lacks the expertise 
emanating from political connections. Finally, we find similar results when we examine target 
firms that engage into lobbying, an alternative corporate political strategy. 
In the last part of our empirical analysis we take a look at the importance of corporate 
political strategies on M&A activity from the bidding firms’ perspective. We find that the 
average connected bidding firm (either through PAC contributions or through lobbying) is more 
likely to place bids and does not overpay for takeovers. These results are consistent with the 
view that political connections facilitate bidder’s activity in the M&A arena.  
This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it shows that ties to 
the takeover market can have important implications for politicians’ careers and for employment 
at district level. This finding suggests that politicians’ incentives to interfere in a takeover may 
provide a mechanism that can affect takeover outcomes. Second, it provides novel empirical 
evidence that corporate political activism affects investments and particularly mergers and 
acquisitions – perhaps the most important corporate investment. Specifically, it lends support to 
the viewpoint that contributions to PACs and lobbying have implications for the takeover 
process and firm valuation that in turn affect the completion of a bid, time to completion, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
difference analysis using the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as an exogenous shock on political 
contributions. We also exploit the Abramoff’s scandal of 2006 as an exogenous shock on lobbying expenditures. 
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takeover premium received. This evidence complements Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2014), 
who investigate how utilities use nonmarket strategies to protect shareholder rents created during 
M&As from dissipation by stringent merger approval conditions. While Holburn and Vanden 
Bergh (2014) focus on how merging firms use campaign contributions to influence the decisions 
of the public utility commissions once the merger is already on the table, we investigate whether 
firms’ PACs and lobbying-based connections can serve as deterrents to being bought. Finally, 
the paper offers implications for campaign finance policies, which can be indeed seen as an 
effective indirect antitakeover tool. 
Our paper is also related to several other prior studies. Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), and 
Faccio et al. (2006) present explicit relations between political connectedness and firm value. We 
report evidence of the relation between political connections and M&A investments. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2004), Goldman et al. (2009), Jayachandran (2006), and Roberts (1990) 
document an association between political contributions and change in firm value by conducting 
political event-based studies. We show that political contributions determine the probability of a 
firm being taken over, time to completion, and takeover premium in M&As. Dinc and Erel 
(2013) examine European Union target firms and show that politicians have several tools in 
deterring a bid when this comes from a foreign bidder preferring the companies to remain 
domestically owned. We use a sample of US target firms and show that contributing to 
politicians and lobbying is likely to facilitate firms’ access to politicians who can influence even 
domestic takeover attempts. Further, Cooper et al. (2010) examine the impact of corporate 
political contributions on the cross-section of stock returns. We investigate their effects on 
several outcomes in a corporate event setting. Ovtchinnikov et al. (2014) suggest that firms use 
their connections to gather political intelligence which allows them to reduce political 
10 
 
uncertainty and boost their innovation efforts. Specifically, political connected firms can 
successfully time their innovation strategies in anticipation of future legislative strategies. The 
ability to innovate and to steer innovation along a safer path of less uncertain future legislation is 
compatible with our argument that political connections can allow firms to overcome some 
regulatory hurdles or to deter competitors to pursue certain strategies. Hill et al. (2013) provide 
evidence of the determinants and effects of corporate lobbying, while Adelino and Dinc (2014) 
show how financial health affects a firm’s lobbying. We examine the relation between lobbying 
activities and M&As. Finally, a study that is closer to ours, is the one by Ferris, Houston, and 
Javakhadze (2016), which examines the effect of political connections on M&As from the 
bidder’s side. They show that bidders with political connections – via the appointment of former 
politicians and regulators to boards of directors or management teams – are more likely to: 
acquire target firms, pay higher premiums, and create value; however, they do not consider the 
impact of target firm political connections and their interrelation with those of the bidders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our sample, the measures of political contributions, and the variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 4 examines the effects of political contributions on the probability 
of takeover bids, time to completion, and takeover premium. Moreover, it examines the impact 
of lobbying on takeover outcomes. The effects of bidder’s corporate political strategies on M&A 
outcomes are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses development  
Political connections play a crucial role in the takeover process, in which politicians’ 
interests can interact with those of firms involved in takeovers. For example, PAC contributions-
11 
 
based connections can be used by firms to exert direct influence that is aimed at either enabling a 
preferred merger deal or providing protection against unwanted takeovers. Firms often contribute 
money in order to gain better access to politicians (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) and 
politically connected firms are likely to enjoy regulatory benefits (see, for example, De Soto, 
1989; Stigler, 1971). In this respect, it is not uncommon for companies to direct their PAC 
contributions toward leading politicians who serve on committees that oversee the industries they 
operate in. For example, whereas firms rarely disclose the involvement of politicians in an M&A 
transaction, there is both academic (see, Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2004, 2008) and anecdotal 
evidence that politicians tied to target firms may influence the antitrust agencies to investigate 
particular aspects of a transaction and encourage them to make a formal legal challenge.
 10 
 
Additionally, as suggested by Dinc and Erel (2013), in some cases, politicians themselves 
might have an incentive to discourage bidding attempts for reasons of economic nationalism. 
Nevertheless, even from the politicians’ side, if economic nationalism is not the only underlying 
motivation behind political intervention in the takeover process, it is also highly likely for them 
to be particularly interested in takeover activities by firms they are connected to.
11
 In particular, 
politicians may have an incentive to deter the bid for a firm they are connected with, unless this 
company decides to sell itself. In this way, politicians may preserve their corporate clientele. 
                                                 
10
 From OpenSecrets.org, May 14, 2014, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/05/big-telecom-proposed-mergers-
will-test-companies-relationships-in-washington/: [But this week brought market-moving news of another potential 
industry merger – this time a $50 billion deal between DirecTV and AT&T that would create one of the few 
companies that might be able to match Comcast’s Washington influence. The question is whether the companies 
have enough friends in Washington to clear the regulatory hurdles that both deals face]. If we accept that firms can 
intervene with their political connections in clearing the regulatory hurdles, then under the same rationale it is 
plausible to claim that firms use their political connections to put obstacles in a deal. In fact, [AT&T (that is the 
target firm in the above deal) is responsible for more campaign cash than any organization in the 
entire Communications/Electronics sector. So far in this cycle, the telecom giant has handed out more than $1.9 
million in campaign contributions….]. 
11
 We need to stress at this point that our results on the effects of corporate political strategies in M&As are identical 
in domestic acquisitions as well (that, in any case, represent the vast majority in our sample accounting for 87.69% 
of all deals), implying that economic nationalism is just one possible motivation behind political intervention and 
cannot solely explain our findings. 
12 
 
Career considerations could also play a role in the way connected politicians may behave. The 
value of a good relationship with contributing firms may be particularly high for politicians that 
are considering to either start a carrier in the industry or return to their previous employer. 
Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) also find that politicians lose contributions from individuals 
when local companies are lost. This could give an incentive for the politicians to avoid that firms 
from their districts fall prey of acquirers, especially if this could lead to a reputational loss for 
their district and/or a relocation of the workforce.  
Lobbying, an alternative corporate political strategy, has also been shown to be beneficial 
for firms (e.g., see Hill et al., 2013).
12
 In contrast to PAC contributions though, lobbying 
expenses are not subject to strict limits and are channelled to politicians through intermediaries 
(lobbying by outside law firms) or through “in house” entities (corporate lobbying 
divisions/departments).
13
 From the perspective of a bidder, target firms’ lobbying activities may 
be attractive to potential bidders lacking these types of ties, which would justify a high takeover 
premium.  
In sum, we argue that in the takeover process, target firm connectedness complicates the 
takeover process. In particular, we predict that politically connected firms through PAC 
contributions and lobbying activities are less likely to be taken over. Additionally, conditional on 
bid receipt, target firm PAC contributions and lobbying are associated with longer time to 
completion of the takeover deal. 
                                                 
12
 A recent example involves lobbying firms facing increased likelihood of receiving stimulus funds when in distress 
(Adelino and Dinc, 2014). 
13
 Lobbyists meet with politicians and their appointees to further the interests of the companies they represent. The 
past 30 years have seen a significant expansion of corporate lobbying activity. According to Drutman (2011), 
politically active organizations in 2009 spent $3.47 billion on direct lobbying expenses. Controlling for inflation, 
this amount was seven times the estimated lobbying expenses in 1983. About 70 percent of this money was spent on 
behalf of the businesses. In a recent article in The Economist, it is stated that […lobbyists… are former congressmen, 
congressional staffers or members of the executive branch. Lobbyists in turn donate to or organize donations for 
congressmen...] (Source: The Economist, November 8, 2014). 
13 
 
In addition, as discussed above, political connections are formed over time as firms slowly 
learn to manage their corporate political strategies. Both PAC contributions-based and lobbying–
based connections can be regarded as strategies that can facilitate future growth opportunities, by 
influencing political outcomes (e.g., legislative action), thus offering a competitive advantage to 
the firm who possesses them. Whether in the context of M&A deals the above effect would 
translate into a higher takeover premium offered for the target firm depends on the bidder’s 
ability and need to successfully integrate these strategies in the merged firm. On the one hand, if 
target firm’s political connections are based on political expertise that is difficult for the bidding 
firm to independently replicate after the M&A deal, it is likely that bidders would offer a higher 
takeover premium. Therefore, we hypothesize that target firms’ PACs contributions and 
lobbying-based political connections are associated with a higher takeover premium by bidding 
firms, when bidders do not have similar political connections. 
On the other hand, if target firm’s corporate political strategies are based on know-how 
about political involvement that the bidder already has, then they could easily be replicated by 
the acquiring firm after the M&A deal. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis in this case is that 
target firms’ PACs contributions and lobbying-based political connections that can be easily 
replicated by the acquiring firm are not associated with a higher takeover premium.  
 
3. Data, measures of political contributions and variable definitions 
3.1.  Data sources and sample selection 
Our sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms jointly listed on the 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial files and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
files for the period 1991 to 2010. We collect data on stock prices, outstanding shares, and stock 
14 
 
returns from CRSP. From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual data on accounting and financial 
variables, as well as the locations of firms’ headquarters. We assign firms to geographic 
locations based on headquarter or home office address information. Since COMPUSTAT 
provides only the latest address information without showing historical changes of firm location, 
we use the detailed address information from Compact Disclosure to account for address 
changes. We then require a firm to have financial and accounting data on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. 
We collect a sample of acquisitions announced between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 
2011 from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We include both 
successful and unsuccessful acquisitions of US publicly listed target firms with a deal value 
above US$ 1 million. The bidder is a listed US or foreign firm.
14
 To be included in the 
acquisition sample, the bidder must seek to purchase more than 50% of the target firm’s equity.15 
These steps produce an acquisition sample of 4,396 deals (3,761 completed deals), which 
overlaps with the COMPUSTAT/CRSP sample.  
We devise measures of corporate political strategies based on corporate contributions to 
US political campaigns at federal level. Following Cooper et al. (2010), we extract the corporate 
contributions data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary files on political 
contributions to House and Senate election campaigns. General elections are held every two 
years in the United States and thus new party alignment for each state emerges from each 
election.
16
 We manually collect detailed information on party affiliation and control from 
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 Our results are qualitatively similar when using domestic acquisitions only. 
15
 If the firm receives multiple bids during a given year, the first deal is considered in our analysis.  
16
 Political contributions were not allowed to be funded from the corporate treasury, but only through PACs to which 
firm directors, employees, and their families could support candidates for elections up to a maximum of $10,000 per 
candidate per election cycle ($5,000 contributed during a primary election and $5,000 contributed during a general 
election) (Cooper et al., 2010). This limit changed in 2010 with a Supreme Court ruling that gave rise to the creation 
of “Super PACs”. These PACs are supposed to not be directly linked to candidates and to deal with political issues 
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different volumes of “Taylor’s Encyclopedia of Government Officials: Federal and State” and 
“State Elective Officials and the Legislatures”. We gather state and county-level vote 
information from the US Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov) and Dave Leip’s Atlas of US 
Presidential Elections (http://uselectionatlas.org). 
We manually collect corporate lobbying expenditures from the lobbying database of the 
United States Senate (http://www.senate.gov) and the OpenSecrets (http://www.opensecrets.org) 
website of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which tracks the influence of money on US 
politics and how that money affects policy and citizens’ lives. After the passage of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives are required to disclose lobbying-related information, verify its accuracy, and 
compile lobbying data. Data include filing dates for lobbying activities, lobbying amounts, 
registrant’s name and address, client’s name and address and industry classification related to a 
bill in which a firm’s lobbying activity is involved. Data have been recorded since 1998, and 
therefore our corporate lobbying expenditures are available from 1998, which are used to test the 
effects on M&As starting from 1999. 
Finally, we create the final sample that contains the complete set of information on 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP variables, acquisitions, political contributions, and lobbying expenditures 
for 109,648 firm-year observations (3,761 target firm-year observations and 105,887 non-target 
firm-year observations). Appendix A provides a detailed description of how all variables are 
constructed and the sources of information used.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
instead. Super PACs can raise unlimited amounts of money from notionally independent groups of any kind, such as 
individuals, businesses or unions. Our study uses primarily data prior to the emergence of “Super PACs”.  
16 
 
3.2. Measures of political contributions  
We construct measures of corporate political contributions for politicians who serve on 
committees that oversee the industries contributing firms operate in.
17
 We present a mapping 
between committees and the 49 Fama-French industries in Appendix B. This mapping shows that 
while some committees are general (e.g., Committee on Budget), others are specific to certain 
industries. This allows us to capture the connections that are more valuable to the firm. We 
employ five measures: the four measures introduced by Cooper et al. (2010) plus the total 
amount of contributions. They are: 
1) The “political index” (PI) for the number of candidates supported by the firm.  
                                    

_ , 51
Jcandidates raw
it jt tj
PI Candidate ,  (1) 
where Candidatejt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has contributed money to 
candidate j over the years t-5 to t, and zero otherwise. Candidate j is an elected member of a 
committee that oversees the firm’s industry. 
2) The strength of the relations between candidates and the contributing firm. It is 
measured by the total length of relations between the firm and the candidates.   
                          
_
, 5 , 51
cand
J jtstrength raw
it jt t jt jt toppj
jt
Vote
PI Candidate I Length
Vote
,  (2) 
where Ijt is an indicator variable equal to one if candidate j is in office at time t and zero 
otherwise, 
cand
jt
Vote  is the number of votes that candidate j’s party holds in office at time t, 
opp
jt
Vote  is the number of votes that candidate j’s opposing party holds in office at time t, and 
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 We have also repeated the tests conducted in this paper using the exact Cooper et al. (2010) measures of political 
contributions, which are based on a broader definition of connections that considers any PAC-based link between 
corporations and politicians as opposed to our measure that is restricted to corporate ties to politicians serving on 
committees that oversee the industries contributing firms operate in. The results we obtained from the broader 
measures are qualitatively similar to the ones reported here and are available from the authors upon request. 
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Lengthjt,t-5 is the number of months that firm i has maintained an uninterrupted relation with 
candidate j until time t. 
3) The ability of the politicians to help the firm. It is measured by the home state of the 
firm and the candidate.  
                            

  _ 1
cand
J jtability raw hom e
it jt,t -5 jt oppj
jt
Vote
PI Candidate I
Vote
,  (3) 
where 
hom e
jt,t -5
Candidate  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if candidate j is running for office from 
the state in which firm i is headquartered and is elected. 
4) The power of the candidates supported by the firm. It is measured by the candidate’s 
committee ranking.   
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,  (4) 
where  
cand
mt
Committee rank is the reciprocal of candidate j’s rank on committee m (the smaller 
the more important), and Median committee rankmt is the median number of members on a given 
committee m of which candidate j is a member.  
5) The total amount of contributions made by the firm.  
                                   

_ , 51
Jcontributions raw
it jt tj
PI Contribution ,  (5) 
where Contributionjt,t-5 is the contributed money to candidate j over the years t-5 to t.  
Panel A.1 of Table 1 shows that firms in our sample support, on average, about 1 candidate 
over any given 5-year period. This evidence is in line with the view that corporations need time 
to build relationships with politicians. The average of the strength index suggests that the total 
length of relations between the firm and the candidates is 27.06 candidate-months. For the ability 
index, home candidates provide the firm with the total support of 0.11 (measured by the 
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candidate’s party votes relative to the ones of the opposition party). For the power index in 
which candidates are weighted by the sum of their committee rankings, firms have, on average, 
0.75 candidate-committee-rank units.
 
Finally, the mean of the total political contributions made 
by the firms in any given year in our sample is $849. The average values are substantially 
smaller than those typically reported in other studies due to the fact that our sample includes non-
contributing firms. In addition, we employ a more narrowly defined measure of political 
connections requiring that the connected candidate is an elected member of a committee that 
oversees the firm’s industry.  
Panel A.2 reports the mean values for the sample that contains contributors only (i.e., firms 
with non-zero PAC contribution values). Naturally, the mean values in this subsample are much 
larger and similar to the ones in Cooper et al. (2010). For instance, the mean PI
contributions_raw 
is 
$64,698 with a maximum value that is over $2 million.
18
 Nonetheless, it should be noted that, 
irrespective of the dollar amount of contributions to politicians, we do not argue that it is the 
amount of political contributions per se that affects merger outcomes, but the strength of the 
underlying connections to powerful politicians. As also noted in Ovtchinnikov et al. (2014) the 
true extent of corporate political activism is much higher than what is observable to an 
econometrician; PI variables serve as signals that encompass firms’ ties to politicians, which in 
turn, have an effect on takeover outcomes. 
Appendix C presents the mean values of the political contributions (and lobbying) 
variables by industry based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification codes. It is apparent 
that corporate political strategies are relatively more pronounced in some industries, such as 
defense and tobacco, which calls for controlling for industry fixed effects in our main analysis. 
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 The mean values for PI
candidates_raw
, PI
strength_raw
, PI
ability_raw
, PI
power_raw
, and PI
contributions_raw
 in Cooper et al. (2010) 
are 68.2, 1,188.0, 6.0, 253.0, and 64,694 respectively.  
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*** Please Insert Table 1 About Here *** 
Additionally, we observe that firms that are engaged in political contributions tend to be 
particularly large. In fact, the average market value of assets for firms that make political 
contributions is $14.1bn, which is about 10 times larger than firms that do not make any 
contributions ($1.42bn).
19
 To ensure that our political contribution variables are independent of 
firm size, we use size-orthogonal measures in the regressions analysis. For instance, PI
candidates
 is 
the residual value from the yearly regression of Ln(PI
candidates_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). We 
apply this procedure for all other political contribution variables.
20
 
 
3.3. Variables  
In our empirical analysis, we control for firm characteristics (market value, b/m, leverage, 
cash flow, cash reserves, sales growth, net loss, ROA), industry characteristics (industry M&A 
liquidity, Herfindahl index, merger wave), and deal characteristics (diversifying deal, stock 
payment, tender offer, hostile deal, and competing deal). As mentioned before, detailed 
descriptions of all variables’ definitions can be found in Appendix A. To proxy for firm size we 
use the market value of firm’s assets. Firms with lower, on average, market capitalization, are 
more likely to receive a bid (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). Additionally, 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) provide evidence of a negative relation between target firm size and 
takeover premium. Palepu (1986) suggests a positive association between b/m and takeover 
probability. Dong et al. (2006) show that highly-valued target firms receive lower bid premium. 
Palepu (1986) also finds a negative relation between leverage and takeover bids. Moreover, Stulz 
(1988) argues that higher target firm leverage results in greater takeover premium offered. Cash 
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 The difference in the average market value of assets between these two groups is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
20
  Our results are generally consistent when using the raw measures of political contributions. 
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flows proxy for management efficiency. According to Palepu (1986), management efficiency is 
negatively associated with the probability to receive a bid. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) document a 
positive relation between cash flows and takeover premium. The relation between cash reserves 
and the probability of being acquired is not straightforward. On the one hand, cash reserves may 
decrease the probability because they might be used by the firm to defend against the bid; on the 
other hand, cash may attract the attention of some bidders who might want, by acquiring the 
target firm, to also add cash reserves into their firms’ balance sheets. Palepu (1986) predicts a 
positive relation between firm sales growth and the probability to receive a bid. We expect a 
positive (negative) association between net loss (ROA) and the probability to be acquired as 
firms that perform poorly are usually the most likely candidates to receive a bid and also bidders 
often prefer to acquire firms with net losses for fiscal reasons (i.e., to lower their taxable 
income).  
To account for the liquidity of corporate assets within an industry, we include in our 
analysis the industry M&A liquidity variable as in Uysal (2011) and Harford and Uysal (2014). 
Uysal (2011) and Harford and Uysal (2014) show a positive association between industry M&A 
liquidity and likelihood of an acquisition. We also control for merger waves using the indicator 
created by Harford (2005). Industry concentration might also influence the propensity of firms to 
conduct acquisitions as firms in highly concentrated industries have fewer competitors that can 
serve as targets reducing the number of within-industry acquisitions. Uysal (2011) and Harford 
and Uysal (2014) use the Herfindahl index to control for this effect and find a negative 
association with acquisition probability. Prior literature has documented that typically 
diversifying M&As are associated with lower takeover premium (Officer, 2003). Huang and 
Walkling (1987) report that takeover premium in cash-financed acquisitions is larger than the 
21 
 
one paid in share-for-share transactions. Schwert (2000) finds that tender offers and hostile deals 
have a positive relation with the premium offered. Finally, Rossi and Volpin (2004) document a 
positive association between competing bids and takeover premium.  
 
3.4. Summary statistics 
Table 1, Panel B shows that our sample firms have a mean market value of $1.95 billion. 
The mean for the book-to-market ratio is less than one, implying that the average firm in our 
sample has high growth opportunities.
21
 Mean firm debt and cash reserves account for 20% and 
18%, respectively, of the total assets, and average cash flows represent the 24% of the market 
value of equity. The mean sales growth is 27%, while 33% of the firms experienced a net loss at 
the fiscal year-end. Finally, the average ROA is negligible (0.55%), while the median is 4.91%.  
With regards to deal characteristics, diversifying and stock deals account on average for 
34% and 38%, respectively, of all bids. Tender offers represent almost one fifth of the overall 
takeover activity, while there are relatively few hostile deals (5.64% of the total). Further, only 
5.32% of the takeover bids involve a competing bidder, whereas US bidders account for the lion 
share of the overall takeover activity (87.69%). Regarding the method of payment, about 30% of 
the deals are paid for with cash. Additionally, approximately 31.25% of the deals take place 
during a merger wave. The average relative size is 0.32 and the mean time to completion is 134 
days. Finally, over our sample period, the average takeover premium paid is approximately 46%. 
In Table 2 we perform univariate analysis by comparing political contributions and firm 
characteristics for two groups of firms: firms whose deal was completed and those that their deal 
was not completed. The comparisons allow us to draw some useful initial inferences. In 
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 Alternatively, a book-to-market value that is significantly lower than one can indicate overvaluation (Dong et al., 
2006). 
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particular, in Panel A, we find that the mean values of all five political contribution variables are 
significantly higher in the cases of firms whose deal was not completed than in the cases of those 
firms that were acquired. This is a first indication that political contributions complicate takeover 
attempts making them relatively harder to get completed. 
Panel B shows the differences for firm characteristics. Firms that are not acquired are 
larger and have higher book-to-market, leverage, and cash flows and are more likely to 
experience a net loss, than firms that are not acquired. 
*** Please Insert Table 2 About Here *** 
 
4.  Empirical findings 
4.1.  Why do politicians care about M&A deals involving connected firms? 
The above hypothesized effects of corporate political connections on takeover deals can be 
easily motivated in a world where politicians’ careers are affected by M&A outcomes. Given 
that politicians are often primarily concerned about prolonging their careers, a link between 
takeover outcomes and political connections can be based on the premise that politicians’ chance 
of getting re-elected and their ability to raise funds from PAC donations is affected by the nature 
of their connections to target firms and acquirers in recent takeover deals. M&As may also 
impact politicians’ reputation if job losses in their jurisdiction follow the acquisition of a local 
firm. 
To test this conjecture, we set up a politician-level dataset that includes all politicians 
serving in Congress during the years covering our empirical investigation period (i.e., 1992-
2011). This dataset comprises of 8,263 politician-year observations with information on 
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politicians’ personal characteristics as well as on the extent of their connections to firms involved 
in takeover deals in that year.  
We regress politician’s re-election (Panel A) and future PAC contributions (Panel B) on 
variables describing connections to target and acquiring firms along with other characteristics. In 
Panel A of Table 3 we estimate a probit model, in which the dependent variable (Re-election) 
takes the value of one if the politician is re-elected in the following election after the takeover 
and zero otherwise. Our key variables are as follows: Total PAC contributions are the total 
amount of PAC contributions in the year of the merger deal. # of connected target firms 
(acquirers) is the number of target firms (acquirers) that are connected to a particular politician 
via PAC contribution. Total size of connected target firms (acquirers) is the sum of total assets 
of connected target firms (acquirers). We then also explore models where the aforementioned 
count and size-based connection variables are split into those pertaining to completed and failed 
deals. 
We include a number of control variables that can potentially have an impact on a 
politician’s possibility to get re-elected; first, we include a host of indicator variables denoting 
the politician’s chamber (Senator, takes the value of one if the politician is a Senator and the 
value of zero if the politician is a House member), party (Democrat), and alignment with the 
Presidential party (Aligned). Then we include the politician’s age (Age) and an ideology measure 
(Ideology distance) computed as the ratio of the ideology distance from the opposite party’s 
average ideology score to the ideology distance from the own party’s average ideology score.22 
We also include state-level control variables such as Corruption (measured as the number of 
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 This measure is derived from DW-nominate legislator scores (McCarty et al., 1997) that can be downloaded from 
http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm. 
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public figures’ convictions divided by the state population in millions) and PAI, a state-level 
political alignment index developed by Kim et al. (2012). 
We find in column (1) that the number of ties to target firms is negatively related to a 
politician’s re-election, while the number of ties to acquirers is positively affecting re-election. 
When we account for the total size (measured by the sum of total assets) of the target firms or 
acquirers connected to a politician (column (2)), we find consistent results.  
In the following two models, we split the connection variables into those pertaining to 
firms involved in completed takeover deals and those involved in failed deals. Interestingly, the 
results shown in columns (3) and (4) indicate that connections to target firms involved in 
completed deals are especially harmful for politicians’ re-election. The absolute value of the 
coefficient of the # of connected target firms with completed deal (-1.6820) is more than six 
times as large as that of the # of connected target firms with failed deal (-0.2562), and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, these results imply that politicians 
connected to target firms may have an incentive to obstruct takeover deals in order to minimize 
the damage to their possibility of getting re-elected. The results in columns (3) and (4) also show 
that for politicians with connections to acquirers the effect is opposite; it is the failed deals that 
can lead them to not being re-elected in the following elections. This evidence sheds light on the 
different motivations that politicians may have when the firms they are connected to play the role 
of a bidder versus the role of a target firm in a takeover process. It also implies that these 
different motivations can cause politicians to interfere in takeovers and cause such transactions 
to become more complicated and more difficult to complete.   
In Panel B, we test whether having ties to firms (targets and acquirers) involved in 
takeovers in year t affects the amount of PAC contributions a politician can attract in the 
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following year, i.e., t+1. The results in columns (1) and (2) show that both connections to target 
firms and to acquirers are positively associated with future PAC contributions. When we re-
estimate the models using the split variables that account for the success or failure of the deals 
(see columns (3) and (4)), we observe that future PAC contributions are maximized when 
politicians’ connections to target firms involve failed deals, whereas the opposite is true for 
politicians’ connections to acquirers.  
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that politicians with ties to firms involved in 
takeovers have an incentive to interfere with the process. Moreover, the incentives of politicians 
connected to target firms are diametrically opposite from those connected to acquirers. On the 
one hand, politicians with connections to target firms seem to benefit from undermining the deals 
because that increases their chances to win upcoming elections and to raise the amount of PAC 
contributions in the future. On the other hand, politicians connected to bidders can improve their 
chances of getting re-elected and increase the amount of money they can raise via PACs in the 
future if the takeover is completed. Thus, given the opposite incentives described above we 
expect that political connections can affect takeover outcomes.  
*** Please Insert Table 3 About Here *** 
To further reinforce our conjecture that politicians have incentives to interfere in the M&A 
process, we examine whether employment in their district drops following the acquisition of 
district firms. If this is the case, local politicians’ chances of re-election would be severely 
damaged because higher unemployment could translate into an unhappy constituency. 
We perform the analysis in Table 4. We run OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regressions in 
which the dependent variable, employment change, is defined as the percentage change in the 
total number of employees in the politician’s district between year y and year y+1. We have 
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three main variables of interest: i) total size of acquired firms in the politician’s district in year y; 
ii) total sales of acquired firms in the politician’s district in year y; and iii) total number of 
employees of acquired firms in the politician’s district in year y. In our model we control for 
other politician-specific and location-specific factors that could potentially affect employment 
change. These are: Democrat, an indicator variable taking the value of one (zero) if the district’s 
politician is a democrat (republican); Aligned, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the district’s politician belongs to the same party as the President, and 0 otherwise; State 
corruption, the number of convictions divided by state population in millions. We also include 
year and state fixed effects. All our main variables of interest carry a negative coefficient at the 
1% significance level, which suggests that acquisitions of firms located in a district lead to an 
increase in district-level unemployment. Since higher unemployment is likely to decrease local 
incumbent politicians’ chances of getting re-elected, this result implies that politicians may have 
personal incentives to interfere in the M&A process and boost their reputation as job saviours by 
creating shields against unwanted takeovers of firms in their constituencies. 
*** Please Insert Table 4 About Here *** 
 
4.2.  Probability of being acquired  
Having established that politicians have incentives to interfere with the takeover, we start 
our empirical tests by examining whether corporate political connections can affect the 
probability of a firm being acquired. Firms are regarded as politically connected if they present 
non-zero values in any of the political contribution variables (i.e., PI
candidates
, PI
strength
, PI
ability
, 
PI
power
, and PI
contributions
). 
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In Panel A of Table 5, we find that among 105,054 firm-year observations involving non-
politically connected firms, 3,702 (3.52%) firm-year observations involve firms that were 
acquired. The probability decreases to 1.28% (59/4,594) for those firms that are politically 
connected, which represents almost a two-thirds (i.e., 63.56%=(1.28%–3.52%)/3.52%) decrease 
in the probability of being taken over relative to non-politically connected firms. Therefore, the 
effect of political connections in reducing the probability of being acquired seems to be 
economically significant.  
Panel B shows the effect of political contributions on the probability of a firm being taken 
over accounting for control variables that will be used in the multivariate analysis below (i.e., 
market value, b/m, leverage, cash flows, cash reserves, ROA, sales growth, net loss, industry 
M&A liquidity, merger wave and the Herfindahl index). We find that political contributions lead 
to a decrease in the probability of being acquired by 71.59%. After having shown some 
preliminary evidence confirming our hypothesis that politically connected (target) firms 
experience a different treatment in takeover bids, we proceed to conduct multivariate analysis in 
the next sections. 
*** Please Insert Table 5 About Here *** 
 
4.3.  Probability of being acquired: probit analysis 
We now examine the relation between the probability of being acquired and political 
connections measured by the different variables constructed using the PAC contributions’ 
information. The analysis is conducted in a multivariate framework by controlling for various 
characteristics, which prior literature has shown to affect acquisition investments. Table 6 reports 
the results. We run pooled probit regressions where the dependent variable takes the value of one 
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if the firm was taken over and zero otherwise. We lag all independent variables, including the 
five measures of political contributions. All regressions also control for year, industry and state 
fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for the sake of brevity. Moreover, we use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at firm level.
23
  
Our main variables of interest are in order PI
candidates
, PI
strength
, PI
ability
, PI
power
, and 
PI
contributions
 in specifications (1) through (5). We find that the coefficients on all PI variables are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates that contributions to 
PACs decrease the probability of a firm being taken over. From the control variables, B/M, ROA, 
merger wave and the industry M&A liquidity exhibit a positive relation with the probability of 
being acquired, while cash flows and Herfindahl index have a negative association with the 
takeover completion, with coefficients which are significantly different from zero at better than 
5% level, in line with the existing M&A literature. Market value and sales growth only do not 
carry the predicted sign in our sample. Overall, the results shown in Table 6 are consistent with 
the notion that target firms’ ties with politicians established via PAC donations can complicate 
takeovers, ultimately reducing the probability of being acquired.  
*** Please Insert Table 6 About Here *** 
 
4.4. Endogeneity  
Below we provide three tests to mitigate the potentially endogenous nature of the 
relationship between a firm’s political connections and the probability of getting acquired.  We 
use a conditional logit estimation to reduce the concern that our results are determined by 
omitted variables. We employ a two-stage instrumental variable approach where firms’ 
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 We obtain similar results when we split the sample into hostile and friendly deals. We also re-run the analysis for 
subsamples based on firms’ size. While results are stronger for larger firms, the main findings hold also for the 
subsample of smaller firms.  
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geographic dispersion across US states is used as instrumental variable to test reverse causality. 
A Heckman selection model is used to address self-selection. Finally, we also use the 
introduction of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) as a shock on political 
contributions.  
 
4.4.1. Conditional logit estimation 
To alleviate the concern that the association between political connections and takeover 
probability is driven by omitted variables, we run a conditional logit regression using cross-
sectional data as of the fiscal year end before the bid announcement (Bena and Li, 2014).
24
 For 
each target, five pseudo target firms from the same Fama-French 49 industry are matched by 
market value, B/M, and one-year previous stock return using a propensity score-matching 
method.
25
 In the conditional logit regression, the control variables at firm and industry level are 
the same as the ones used in Table 6.
26
 The models also include a fixed effect for each target and 
its matching firms, i.e., a deal fixed effect. Consistent with our findings in Table 6, the regression 
results shown in Table 7 confirm that all PI variables are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.
27
 Thus, PAC donations reduce the probability of acquisition completion even after 
performing a conditional logit analysis. 
*** Please Insert Table 7 About Here *** 
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 As suggested by Puri et al. (2011), non-linear models like probit suffer from an incidental parameters problem: 
both the firm fixed effects and, more importantly, the coefficients of the other control variables cannot be 
consistently estimated in panels with thousands of firms and a small number of years (see also Greene, 2004).  
25
 We also employ all control variables to obtain the five closest matched firms. We re-test Table 7 using these new 
matching firms and obtain qualitatively similar results. The table is available from the authors upon request. 
26
 We also run the model without the two industry-level variables. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table 7 and available from the authors upon request.  
27
 Note that in this analysis the signs of market value and sales growth are consistent to the prior literature. 
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4.4.2. Two-stage instrumental variable and Heckman selection models 
Next, we consider the reverse casuality and self-selection issues in a two-stage model 
setting. In the first-stage, we estimate the PI indicator, which takes the value of 1 if the firm 
presents non-zero values in any of the political contribution variables (PI
candidates_raw
, PI
strength_raw
, 
PI
ability_raw
, PI
power_raw
, and PI
contributions_raw
) and 0 otherwise.
28
 We use firms’ geographic 
dispersion across U.S. states as an instrumental variable. We measure firm’s geographic 
diversification based on the number of economically relevant states, developed by Garcia and 
Norli (2012).
29
 Since the degree of geographic diversification is highly correlated with firm size, 
we take the residual value from the regression of the number of states on Ln(total sales+1).
30
 The 
rationale for choosing this variable as an instrument is based on the idea that a firm whose 
operations are geographically dispersed is more likely to contribute to PACs supporting 
campaigns of politicians not only from its home (i.e., headquarter) state but also from the 
different states the firm is active. However, it is not clear whether geographic dispersion 
necessarily drives M&A outcomes. Accordingly, the second-stage model uses the fitted value of 
PI indicator to estimate the probability of being taken over (Acquired).  
In addition, we use the Heckman’s (1979) selection model where we include the inverse of 
Mill’s ratio (calculated from the first-stage model) to control for sample-selection bias. The 
model accounts for the possibility that firm characteristics, which cause firms’ decision to 
become politically active by making PAC contributions, can affect the probability of target firms 
being acquired.  
                                                 
28
 We also separately test with the indicators of individual PI variables and find similar results. 
29
 Garcia and Norli (2012) measure the degree of corporate geographic diversification by counting state names from 
annual reports filed with the SEC on Form 10-K over the period 1994 to 2008. We thank the authors for kindly 
sharing their data. 
30
 We employ total sales and not total assets because the industry's Herfindahl Index, which is commonly measured 
based on sales, is one of the most crucial determinants according to the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use the residual value from the 
regression of the number of states on Ln(total sales+1). We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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The results of the two-stage model regressions are reported in Table 8. We find that both 
the two-stage instrumental variable (IV) and Heckman selection models yield a significant 
negative relationship between political connections and getting acquired. As expected, in the first 
stage of the two-stage IV model, corporate geographic dispersion is positively associated with 
the PI indicator at the 1% significance level. The coefficient of our main variable of interest (the 
instrumented PI indicator) in the second stage remains significantly negative. The Heckman 
selection model also generates a negative and significant coefficient on the PI indicator in the 
second-stage model. Moreover, the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio is positive and 
significant, indicating that the characteristics that make firms choose to become politically active 
by making PAC contributions are also positively associated with the likelihood of becoming a 
takeover target and getting acquired. Overall, these findings confirm the negative relation 
between target firms’ political connections via PAC contributions and the probability of being 
acquired after controlling for potential endogeneity bias. 
*** Please Insert Table 8 About Here *** 
 
4.4.3. Difference-in-difference test with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) 
A major regulatory change that could potentially have affected corporate political 
strategies took place in 2002. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) was enacted on 
March 27 and took effect on November 6, after the 2002 election. Although BCRA increased the 
contribution limits for individuals giving “hard money” to federal candidates and political parties 
through PAC contributions, the primary feature of the law was the introduction of restrictions on 
the use of “soft money”, i.e., money raised outside the limits and prohibitions of federal 
campaign finance law.   
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Assuming that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was successful in reducing 
the role of soft money in political campaigns, and to the extent that in our tests the impact of 
PAC contributions prior to BCRA was amplified by unobservable associated soft money flows to 
politicians, we expect to observe a decrease in the effect of PAC donations post-BCRA. 
Therefore, we interpret the BCRA as an exogenous negative shock on the strength of political 
connections proxied by PAC contributions.  
We perform a difference-in-difference analysis for the probability of being taken over in 
the five years pre (1997-2001) and post (2003-2007) the introduction of BCRA in 2002. Firms 
that use PAC contributions are considered treated, while firms without PAC contributions 
represent the control group in the analysis. Table 9 presents the results with the OLS estimates. 
We find that firm contributions to PACs are negatively associated with the probability of being 
acquired at the 1% significance level for all five PAC contribution measures. Further, the effect 
of political contributions on the takeover process decreased after the introduction of the BCRA 
given the finding that the interaction coefficients of treated PAC contributions variables with 
post-BCRA period are all positive and significant at better than the 5% significance level.  
Overall, the results of this analysis of an exogenous shock on firms’ political strategies 
provide further support for the notion that target firms’ political connections can complicate 
M&As and thereby reduce the probability of a target firm being acquired.  
*** Please Insert Table 9 About Here *** 
 
4.5. Time to completion  
In previous sections we showed that political connections decrease the likelihood of 
receiving a takeover bid. We now investigate whether they can complicate the process once the 
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offer arrives. We therefore test whether target firms’ PAC contributions are also associated with 
a delay in the M&A process from the announcement until the completion of the deal. In our 
setting this is of particular interest given that as shown in Table 3 politicians with ties to takeover 
targets would rather prefer that the deal fails. We thus predict a positive relation between target 
firms’ political connectedness and the time to completion of the deal. We test this hypothesis and 
report the results in Table 10. 
We run OLS regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. In Panel A, the dependent variable is time to completion, which measures the number 
of calendar days between the announcement date and the completion date as reported by 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database.
31
 A positive coefficient on the 
political contribution variables would constitute further evidence in favor of the view that PAC 
contributions-based political connections can complicate the takeover process. In addition to the 
previously used control variables, we also add US bidder, which is an indicator variable taking 
the value of one for bids made by US firms, and zero otherwise. We expect that it takes less time 
for US bidders to buy domestic target firms. 
In all five specifications, the coefficients on the PI variables are positive and significantly 
different from zero at better than the 5% significance level. Economically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the residual PAC contribution (i.e., PI
contributions
) from no contribution is 
associated with 7.76 days extension in time to completion (=4.3597*1.7807) indicating that deals 
involving target firms with PAC contributions take longer to complete. This finding is 
economically meaningful since it is based on size-orthogonal measures, i.e., it captures the effect 
relative to other firms of similar size.  
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 Our results are unchanged if we use the logarithmic transformation of time to completion as the dependent 
variable. 
34 
 
*** Please Insert Table 10 About Here *** 
Political connections should be more valuable especially when the firm is at risk of 
receiving a takeover offer from an unwanted suitor. Relying on the takeover index of Cain, 
McKeon and Solomon (2016),
32
 we re-run the analysis on the subsample of firms with a higher 
probability to receive a hostile bid. In untabulated analysis, we find a significantly more positive 
relation between target connectedness via PACs and time to completion in all regressions, in 
support of our prediction. Finally, since we expect that it will take more time for foreign bidders 
to complete the acquisitions, we examine the impact of political contributions on the time to 
completion in cross-border acquisitions. In unreported regressions, we find a pattern similar to 
Table 10 (i.e., deals involving connected targets and foreign bidders take even longer to 
complete), though the significance weakens with only one regression being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that approximately only 13% of our 
sample includes foreign bidders, which reduces substantially the power of our tests. 
In sum, our results thus far reflect the view that politically-connected firms are not only 
less likely to be acquired, but are also associated with a lengthier takeover process. We interpret 
this collective evidence as in support of the idea that target firms’ political connections can 
complicate the takeover process. 
 
4.6. Do bidders pay a takeover premium for political expertise?  
The results from the tests presented in the previous sections suggest that political 
connectedness should complicate the takeover process. In this section, we examine the effect of 
target firms’ PAC contributions on takeover premiums.  
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 Data are available on Stephen McKeon’s webpage (http://pages.uoregon.edu/smckeon/). 
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Given the prior evidence that bonds to politicians complicate the takeover process, they are 
also likely to increase the bargaining power of target firm’s management and allow it to 
negotiate a higher takeover premium. Additionally, since corporate political participation seems 
to follow a path-dependent learning process (Drutman, 2011), firms that initially may have 
viewed corporate political strategies as a mere means to manage political risk, eventually become 
more adept at using connections to influence outcomes, thereby generating valuable growth 
opportunities (i.e., value). If this is indeed the case, then the added managerial flexibility from 
political connections should add value to the target firm, and should be reflected in a higher 
takeover premium, especially in cases where the bidder does not have much political expertise. 
This argument also implies that bidders whose corporate political strategy mirrors that of a 
potential target firm should see no additional benefits associated with the acquisition of the target 
firm’s connections. Therefore, the takeover premium should not be affected by the target firm’s 
connections.   
We test these hypotheses by running regressions where the dependent variable is the 
difference between the offer price and the target firm’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement divided by the latter.
33
 Values beyond the range of (0, 2) are 
winsorized (Officer, 2003). We incorporate the same control variables as in previous analysis. 
We create a dummy variable (bidder’s PI indicator) that takes the value of one if the bidder’s PI 
is greater than 0, and zero otherwise. This variable essentially captures the instances where the 
target firm and bidder political strategies are quite similar. We then interact the bidder’s PI 
indicator with the PI variables to see whether target firm political connections’ effect on 
takeover premium tends to be reduced when the bidding firm has the ability to independently 
implement similar political strategies.  
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 For robustness reasons, we have also used the 1-week premium as our dependent variable. Our results are similar.  
36 
 
Table 11 presents the results. We find that in the absence of bidder political expertise all 
political contribution variables have positive coefficients that are significant at conventional 
levels. This result is in line with the notion that political connections are likely to increase the 
bargaining power of target firm’s management and enable it to negotiate a higher takeover 
premium. It is also in line with the view that the value of growth opportunities associated with 
the managerial flexibility provided by corporate political strategies is, on average, large enough 
to warrant a significant takeover premium. However, consistent with the view that bidders with 
political expertise mirroring the one of the target do not pay a higher premium for target firm’s 
political strategies, all of the estimated coefficients on the interacted terms in Table 11 are 
negative  and significant, with a magnitude that is almost identical with the corresponding PI 
variables. Finally, bidder’s PI indicator is statistically insignificant at conventional levels in four 
out of five models. 
In untabulated regressions, we test whether the premium is positively related to political 
contributions in the subset of bids made by foreign acquirers. We find that the results continue to 
hold in all but one regressions as there is a significantly positive relation between PACs and 
takeover premiums. Additionally, adding the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) as a 
control variable to capture antitakeover provisions does not alter our results. 
*** Please Insert Table 11 About Here *** 
 
4.7. Target firm lobbying activities and M&A deals 
We now turn our attention to an alternative corporate political strategy, namely lobbying. 
Lobbying activities play an important role in shaping corporate policy agenda as managers often 
make use of lobbying channels to get benefits for their firms from politicians (Hill et al., 2013; 
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Adelino and Dinc, 2014). Approximately 15% of firms pursue both political contributions and 
lobbying strategies at some point during the sample period of Hill et al. (2013). Concerning to 
the magnitude of expenditures, lobbying costs are proven to be substantially larger than 
contributions. While there is a legal limit in contributions offered to politicians per election, 
lobbying expenditures are not limited and can be funded from the corporate treasury. Milyo et al. 
(2000) show that lobbying expenditures are 20 to 60 times more than the amount spent on 
contributions.  
In Table 12 we repeat most of the previously shown tests after replacing the PI variables 
with lobbying expenditures, a variable formed by taking the natural logarithm of one plus the 
dollar amount of the target firm’s annual lobbying expenditures.34 Panels A through C provide 
some univariate evidence. On average, firms in our sample incur $62,835 in lobbying 
expenditures as shown in Panel A.
35
 Panel B compares average lobbying expenditures of firms 
that were acquired with those firms that were not acquired. Interestingly, we find that firms that 
were acquired spend, on average, $44,700 on lobbying expenditures, whereas non-acquired firms 
spend, on average, $63,464. This finding is also confirmed when we examine lobbying firms 
only. This indicates that more intensive lobbying, on average, is associated with lower 
probability of a firm being taken over, which is in line with the concept that target firm’s 
political strategies complicate the takeover process. 
In Panel C.1 of Table 12, we find that among 60,052 firm-year observations involving non-
lobbying firms, 2,070 (3.45%) firm-year observations involve firms that were acquired. The 
probability decreases to 2.64% (212/8,016) for those firms that lobby, which represents a 23.28% 
((2.64% – 3.45%)/3.45%) decrease in the probability of being taken over. Panel C.2 shows the 
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 In the regressions, lobbying expenditures is the firm size-orthogonal measure. 
35
 The average spending on lobbying for the subsample that only includes firms that lobby increases to $1.18 million.  
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effect of lobbying activity after accounting for control variables. We find that lobbying is 
associated with a decrease in probability of being taken over relative to firms that do not lobby 
by 24.64%.  
Panel D of Table 12 shows the results of multivariate regression tests. In line with the 
evidence based on political connectedness measured by PAC contributions, the result in column 
(1) indicates that target firms’ lobbying expenditures are significantly associated with lower 
probability of target firms being acquired with a coefficient that is statistically significant at the 
1% level. In the following columns (2) to (6), we deal with the endogeneity issue. Column (2) 
reports the result using a matching-firm approach as was previously done for PAC contributions 
in Table 7. Columns (3) and (4) report the two-stage instrumental variable model regressions, 
while column (5) presents the results of the Heckman selection model. We find that the main 
variables of interest show consistent patterns. 
Column (6) reports the difference-in-difference test result. Similarly to the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act in the case of contributions to PACs, we introduce the Abramoff’s 
scandal as an exogenous shock to the ability of firms to lobby policy makers (see also, Borisov et 
al., 2016). Jack Abramoff, on behalf of his lobbying firm, gave gifts to politicians in exchange 
for support on legislation that favored his firm’s clients. Following the Abramoff’s scandal, 
corporate lobbying has been scrutinized intensely and the influence of lobbyists has arguably 
been reduced. 
Given that the guilty plea was front page news on January 4, 2006 in all major national 
newspapers, we conduct a difference-in-difference OLS analysis for the probability of being 
acquired in the five years pre- (2001-2005) and post- (2007-2011) Abramoff’s scandal.36 Firms 
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 We have also i) included year 2006 in the post period (i.e., 2006 to 2010) and ii) dropped year fixed effects. The 
results are consistent.  
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that lobby are considered treated, while firms without lobbying activities represent the control 
group in the analysis. We find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on the takeover process 
decreases after the Abramoff’s scandal. The interaction coefficient of treated lobbying variable 
with post-Abramoff’s period is positive and significant, in line with target firm’s lobbying 
activities complicating deals and effectively deterring takeover bids. The Abramoff variable 
itself is significantly negative at 1% level. In sum, the results of the exogenous shock introduced 
by the Abramoff’s scandal reinforce our findings for the impact of lobbying expenditures in 
takeovers. 
Column (7) shows that firm’s lobbying activity is also positively related to time to 
completion. Thus, this evidence is consistent with the notion that target firm’s lobbying activities 
can complicate deals effectively acting as a restraint against a takeover. Moreover, the result 
from the regression shown in column (8) indicates that target firm’s lobbying expenditures, just 
like PAC contributions, have an impact on takeover premium. Specifically, the results show that 
a target firm with lobbying activities warrants a higher premium, except for the cases when the 
bidder is also actively lobbying. These findings are in line with the PAC-based connections 
results obtained in Table 11, and reinforce the notion that bidders with political expertise are less 
likely to pay a higher premium for target firms with similar corporate political strategies.  
In sum, the evidence in Table 12 highlights the similarities between target firms’ lobbying 
and PAC contributions in terms of their impact on the takeover process and premium effects.   
*** Please Insert Table 12 About Here *** 
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5. Bidder’s corporate political strategies  
We have argued and provided empirical evidence that target firms’ connections with 
politicians can complicate and delay the completion of takeover deals. An interesting related 
research question concerns the M&A importance of political connections of bidding firms.
 37
 As 
previously shown in Table 3, politicians connected to bidders would prefer that takeover 
attempts end up in success because completed deals involving connected acquiring firms boost 
their chances for re-election and increase the amount of PAC contributions they receive in the 
future. Thus, in this case although political interference can still delay the deal completion, it is 
plausible that political connections can raise the probability for bidders to acquire a target firm. 
Recall that we have already shown in Table 11 that an average connected bidder does not 
overpay when placing a takeover bid (in fact, bidders pay a lower premium when they have the 
ability to independently implement similar to the target firm political strategies).
 
 
Table 13  presents the results for PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures. In columns 
(1) and (3), we find that bidders with political connections are more likely to complete a deal, 
consistent with the view that politicians with ties to the bidder may help them complete the deal 
in order to reap the future benefits in terms of improved chances for re-election and more  
financial support. As shown in columns (2) and (4), time to completion does not decrease. 
Indeed, the coefficient for the bidder’s lobbying expenditure is positive and significant, which 
implies that politicians’ interference with the process can complicate and delay takeover 
transactions from either side of the deal (i.e., both from the target firm – as shown in our 
previous results – and from the bidder).  
*** Please Insert Table 13 About Here *** 
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 Comcast has registered about 76 lobbyists, spread across 24 firms, to work on its pending $45 billion purchase of 
Time Warner Cable, according to first quarter 2014 filings with the Senate Office of Public Records (Time.com: 
April 29, 2014).  
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6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we argue that corporate political strategies can affect M&As. In our empirical 
investigation we first show that politicians suffer losses in terms of ability to raise funds in the 
future, chances of getting re-elected, and reputation (based on implied capability to protect jobs 
in their district) when a connected firm is acquired. Having established the fact that politicians 
have an interest to avoid takeovers of connected firms, we then provide evidence that firms 
contributing to politicians are actually less likely to be taken over and they are involved in a 
longer period of negotiations from the announcement until the time to completion of the deal. 
Additionally, we find that target firms with PAC contributions-based political connections 
command a higher takeover premium from bidders that do not pursue similar political strategies, 
consistent with the notion that such connections render target firms’ growth opportunities more 
valuable, and that bonds to politicians complicate the takeover process, thus increasing the 
bargaining power of target firm’s management and allowing it to negotiate a higher takeover 
premium. In contrast, we do not find a similar premium effect if bidders already possess similar 
political expertise with the prospective target, indicating that political connections are not 
valuable from the perspective of an acquiring firm that has the ability to easily replicate them “in 
house.” We confirm all PAC contributions-based findings using an alternative target firm 
political strategy, namely, lobbying.  
Our findings have important implications for academics, practitioners and policy makers. 
In particular, our results highlight the significance of the takeover market setting as a mechanism 
to examine the valuation implications of corporate political strategies. Our results also imply that 
firms following such political strategies can indirectly use them like an antitakeover tool to 
protect themselves from being acquired, while at the same time they benefit their shareholders in 
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terms of attracting a relatively higher premium from firms lacking political experience. Finally, 
our evidence can trigger a lot of follow-up research questions and discussions regarding 
unexplored questions related to firms that are connected with politicians. For instance, do 
corporate political strategies have an impact on other corporate decisions? If so, what is the 
mechanism through which they are exploited? And can other corporate events allow for the 
pricing of political connections? We hope future research will shed light on these and other 
questions related to the impact of corporate political strategies in the corporate world. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable definitions. 
 
                          Panel A: Political contributions and lobbying expenditures variables 
PI
candidates_raw
 
The number of candidates supported by the firm. 
_
, 51
Jcandidates raw
it jt tj
PI Candidate , where 
Candidatejt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has contributed money to candidate j over 
the years t-5 to t and zero otherwise, as in Cooper et al. (2010). Candidate j is a member of a committee 
that oversees the firm’s industry. The data are collected from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections.  
PI
candidates
 The orthogonal measure of PI
candidates_raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
candidates_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
PI
strength_raw
 The strength of the relations between candidates and the contributing firm. It is measured by the total 
length of relations between the firm and the candidates.  
 
   _ , 5 , 51
cand
J jtstrength raw
it jt t jt jt toppj
jt
Vote
PI Candidate I Length
Vote
, where Ijt is an indicator variable equal 
to one if candidate j is in office at time t and zero otherwise, cand
jt
Vote  is the number of votes that 
candidate j’s party holds in office at time t, opp
jt
Vote  is the number of votes that candidate j’s opposing 
party holds in office at time t, and Lengthjt,t-5 is the number of months that firm i has maintained an 
uninterrupted relation with candidate j until time t, as in Cooper et al. (2010). Candidate j is a member 
of a committee that oversees the firm’s industry. The data are collected from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections.  
PI
strength
 The orthogonal measure of PI
strength_raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
strength_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
PI
ability_raw
 The ability of the politicians to help the firm. It is measured by the home state of the firm and the 
candidate. 

  _ 1
cand
J jtability raw hom e
it jt,t -5 jt oppj
jt
Vote
PI Candidate I
Vote
, where hom e
jt,t -5
Candidate is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if candidate j is running for office from the state in which firm i is headquartered 
and 0 otherwise, as in Cooper et al. (2010). Candidate j is a member of a committee that oversees the 
firm’s industry. The data are collected from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary files on 
political contributions to House and Senate elections.  
PI
ability
 The orthogonal measure of PI
ability_raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
ability_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
PI
power_raw
 The power of the candidates supported by the firm. It is measured by the candidate’s committee 
ranking. 
 
 
     
 
 _ , 51 1
 
  
cand cand
J Mjtpower raw m t
it jt t jt oppj m
jt m t
Vote Com m ittee rank
PI Candidate I
Vote Median com m ittee rank
, where 
Committee  cand
mt
Committee rank  is the reciprocal of candidate j’s rank on committee m (the smaller 
the more important), and Median committee rankmt is the median number of members on a given 
committee m of which candidate j is a member, as in Cooper et al. (2010) for details. Candidate j is a 
member of a committee that oversees the firm’s industry. The data are collected from the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections. 
PI
power
 = the orthogonal measure of PI
power_raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
power_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
PI
power The orthogonal measure of PIpower_raw, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
power_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
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Appendix A – (continued) 
 
Variable definitions. 
 
                                        Panel A: Political contributions and lobbying expenditures variables - Continued 
PI
contributions_raw
 The total amount of contributions made by the firm. 

_ , 51
Jcontributions raw
it jt tj
PI Contribution , where 
Contributionjt,t-5 is the contributed money to candidate j over the years t-5 to t. Candidate j is a member 
of a committee that oversees the firm’s industry. The data are collected from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections.  
PI
contributions
 The orthogonal measure of PI
contributions_raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly regression of 
Ln(PI
contributions_raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
Lobbying expenditures
 raw
 Total value of lobbying expenditures. The lobbying information is collected from the lobbying 
database of the United States Senate (http://www.senate.gov) and the OpenSecrets website 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). In the regressions, it is 
transformed by adding one and taking the natural log.  
Lobbying expenditures The orthogonal measure of Lobbying expenditures
raw
, which is the residual value from the yearly 
regression of Ln(Lobbying expenditures
raw
+1) on Ln(market value+1). 
 Panel B: Dependent Variables 
Acquired A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. The variable is 
created using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Time to completion The number of days between the acquisition announcement and completion date both as reported by 
Thomson Financial SDC.  
Takeover premium Takeover premium from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database, which is 
computed as the difference between the offer price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the 
acquisition announcement divided by the latter. 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Market value Market value of equity plus total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) at the fiscal year-end 
from COMPUSTAT. In the regressions, it is transformed by adding one and taking the natural log. 
Equity value Market value of equity at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
B/M Book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
Leverage Total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets at the fiscal year-end 
from COMPUSTAT. 
Cash flows Cash flows (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization – preferred stock 
dividends – common stock dividends) divided by the market value of equity at the fiscal year-end from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Cash reserves Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
ROA The ratio of operating income to total assets at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
Sales growth Current fiscal year sales minus sales in the previous fiscal year divided by sales in the previous fiscal 
year from COMPUSTAT. 
Net loss A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if net income is negative and 0 otherwise. The variable is 
created at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
Geographic diversification The residual value from the regression of the number of states on Ln(total sales+1), where the number 
of states are counted from annual reports filed with the SEC on Form 10-K, as developed by Garcia 
and Norli (2012). 
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Appendix A – (continued) 
 
Variable definitions. 
 
                                                                          Panel D: Bid characteristics  
Horizontal deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder firms operate in the same Fama-
French 49 industry and 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Cash payment A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the deal in which consideration is 100% cash and 0 
otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. 
Tender offer A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for tender offers and 0 otherwise. The variable is created 
using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Hostile deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise. 
The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Competing deal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals that there is a competing bidder and 0 otherwise. 
The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
US bidder A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for deals in which the bidder is a US firm and 0 otherwise. 
The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
  Panel E: M&A market characteristics 
Industry M&A liquidity Sum of acquisitions values for each year and three-digit SIC code divided by the total assets of 
COMPUSTAT firms in the same three-digit SIC and year from COMPUSTAT. 
Herfindahl index Sum of squares of the market shares of all firms sharing the same three-digit SIC, where market share 
is defined as sales of the firm to the aggregated sales of the industry. 
Merger wave A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the date of announcement occurs during a merger wave 
period following Harford (2005). 
Panel F: Politician characteristics 
Re-election It takes the value of 1 if the politician is re-elected in the following election and 0 otherwise.  
# of Connected target firms 
(acquirers) 
The number of connected target firms (acquirers). Connections between politicians and target firms 
(acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) contributions. 
# of Connected target firms 
(acquirers) with completed 
deal 
The number of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is completed. Connections between 
politicians and target firms (acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) 
contributions. 
# of Connected target firms 
(acquirers) with failed deal 
The number of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is failed. Connections between politicians 
and target firms (acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) contributions. 
Total size of connected target 
firms (acquirers) 
The sum of total assets of connected target firms (acquirers). Connections between politicians and 
target firms (acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) contributions. 
Total size of connected target 
firms (acquirers) with 
completed deal 
The sum of total assets of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is completed. Connections 
between politicians and target firms (acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) 
contributions. 
Total size of connected target 
firms (acquirers) with failed 
deal 
The sum of total assets of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is failed. Connections between 
politicians and target firms (acquirers) are determined by political action committee (PAC) 
contributions. 
Senator An indicator that takes a value of 1 for a Senator and 0 for a House Representative.  
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Appendix A – (continued) 
 
Variable definitions. 
 
Panel F: Politician characteristics - Continued 
Democrat An indicator that takes a value of 1 for a Democratic politician and 0 for a Republican politician.  
Aligned An indicator that takes a value of 1 if the politician is in the same party as the President, and 0 
otherwise.  
Ideology distance The ratio of the ideology distance from the opposite party average to the ideology distance from the 
own party average.  
Age Politician’s age.  
# of connected firms The number of firms connected to the politician via PAC contribution.  
State corruption The number of conviction divided by state population in millions.  
State population The population of the state. 
PAI The state-level political alignment index as in Kim et al. (2012). It is constructed by giving equal 
weight to the portions of each of the state’s delegations in the two chambers of Congress that are 
aligned with the President’s party and to the President’s party control of state politics. PAI
j
 = ¼S
j
 + ¼R
j
 
+ ¼G
j
 + ¼[½ state
jS + ½
state
jR ], where Sj
 = the fraction of the state’s two senators in Washington that 
belong to the President’s party. R
j
 = the percentage of the state’s house representatives in Washington 
that belong to the President’s party. G
j
 = a dummy variable equal to one if the governor belongs to the 
same party as the President, and zero otherwise. state
jS = a dummy variable equal to one if the percent of 
members of the state senate belonging to the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. 
state
jR = a dummy variable equal to one if the percent of representatives in the state house belonging to 
the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B 
 
Mapping Congress committees to Fama-French 49 industry classification.  
 
This table presents a mapping between congress committees and the 49 Fama-French industries. 
 
 Fama-French 49 Industry Classification 
Panel A: Senate Committees 
Committee on Agriculture 1 
      
   
Committee on Appropriations 
       
   
Committee on Armed Services 26 
      
   
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 45 46 47 48 17 18 
 
   
Committee on Budget 
       
   
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 25 40 41 42 43 23 24    
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 27 28 29 30 31 
  
   
Committee on Environment and Public Works 
       
   
Committee on Finance 
       
   
Committee on Foreign Relations 
       
   
Committee on Governmental Affairs 
       
   
Committee on Judiciary 
       
   
Committee on Health, Education, and Labor 11 12 13 2 3 4 5    
Committee on Rules and Administration 
       
   
Committee on Small Business 43 44 
     
   
Committee on Veterans 
       
   
Committee on Aeronautics and Space Science 24 
      
   
Committee Post Office and Civil Service     
Committee on District of Columbia           
Panel B: House Committees 
Committee on Agriculture 1 
      
   
Committee on Appropriations 
       
   
Committee on Armed Services 26 
      
   
Committee on Banking 45 46 47 48 
   
   
Committee on Budget 
       
   
Committee on Government Reform 
       
   
Committee on Education 
       
   
Committee on Commerce 25 40 41 42 43 27 28 29 30 31 
Committee on International Relations 
       
   
Committee on Government Reform 
       
   
Committee on House Administration 
       
   
Committee on Resources 25 40 41 42 43 27 28 29 30 31 
Committee on Judiciary 
       
   
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 25 
      
   
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 
       
   
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 41 23 24 25 17 18 
 
   
Committee on Rules 
       
   
Committee on Science 
       
   
Committee on Small Business 43 44 
     
   
Committee on Standards     
   
   
Committee on Veterans     
   
   
Committee on Ways and Means     
   
   
Committee on Un-American Activities     
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Appendix C 
 
Political contributions and lobbying expenditures by industry.  
 
This table presents the mean values of the political contributions and lobbying variables by Fama-French 49 industry classification codes. 
Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
 
Code Fama-French 49 industries PIcandidates PIstrength PIability PIpower PIcontributions 
Lobbying 
expenditures 
1 Agriculture 0.9913 24.1996 0.1186 0.9751 1,011 63,918 
2 Food products 0.4586 20.1052 0.0119 0.8823 662 92,826 
3 Candy and soda 0.5306 18.1773 0.0000 0.9340 892 54,574 
4 Beer and liquor 2.6474 167 0.1039 4.6219 3,615 360,354 
5 Tobacco products 5.7733 313 0.5534 10.3320 8,633 1,042,032 
6 Recreation 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 16,081 
7 Entertainment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 21,141 
8 Printing and publishing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 44,119 
9 Consumer goods 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 59,296 
10 Apparel 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7,332 
11 Healthcare 0.1880 4.9225 0.0140 0.3426 338 57,019 
12 Medical equipment 0.2281 7.1216 0.0132 0.4437 268 45,583 
13 Pharmaceutical products 0.6242 26.3281 0.0117 0.8473 730 115,121 
14 Chemicals 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 110,173 
15 Rubber and plastic products 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 13,911 
16 Textiles 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 24,255 
17 Construction materials 0.5566 16.8918 0.1015 0.3635 539 28,407 
18 Construction 0.4807 14.0447 0.0989 0.4791 534 25,757 
19 Steel works 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 57,884 
20 Fabricated products 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 375 
21 Machinery 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 46,899 
22 Electrical equipment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 37,717 
23 Automobiles and trucks 2.0293 69.2442 0.3072 1.6512 1,965 109,620 
24 Aircraft 5.7553 194 0.2412 4.8584 5,757 451,248 
25 Shipbuilding and railroad equipment 3.3441 98.4639 0.5535 2.6592 3,863 159,825 
26 Defense 7.3777 232 0.4795 5.9745 7,562 375,880 
27 Precious metals 0.7588 28.1329 0.1031 1.0552 691 55,433 
28 Non-metallic and industrial metal mining 3.3576 129 0.4967 2.5162 3,479 87,275 
29 Coal 4.5531 78.9906 0.4636 3.4544 5,087 245,431 
30 Petroleum and natural gas 2.2937 80.1972 0.2790 1.8709 2,293 88,865 
31 Utilities 7.3629 260 1.1316 5.8908 6,841 263,978 
32 Communication 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 103,782 
33 Personal services 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 31,414 
34 Business services 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 26,545 
35 Computers 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 77,285 
36 Computer software 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 41,117 
37 Electronic equipment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 59,304 
38 Measuring and control equipment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 14,269 
39 Business supplies 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 118,096 
40 Shipping containers 0.8065 9.7913 0.0664 0.1999 489 18,995 
41 Transportation 4.1434 138 0.5215 3.4121 4,166 137,799 
42 Wholesale 0.3709 11.7430 0.0672 0.2735 413 19,031 
43 Retail 1.0969 28.9783 0.1535 0.9924 1,116 47,922 
44 Restaurants, hotels, and motels 0.4902 10.9491 0.0441 0.6612 721 19,176 
45 Banking 0.9295 27.3607 0.1575 0.7314 973 22,125 
46 Insurance 2.4855 74.0460 0.3953 2.6398 2,694 115,887 
47 Real estate 0.0142 0.1967 0.0085 0.0427 31.7536 15,151 
48 Financial trading 0.8893 23.3221 0.0902 0.8444 944 53,101 
49 All others 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 34,599 
Total  0.8244 27.0609 0.1096 0.7452 849 62,835 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics. 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 109,648 firm-year observations over the period 1991 to 2010 (Panels A and B) and 1992 to 2011 
(Panels C and D). Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Panel A.1: Political contributions 
PI
candidates_raw
 109,648 0.8244 4.8736 0.0000 0.0000 35.0000 
PI
strength_raw
 109,648 27.0609 172 0.0000 0.0000 1,267 
PI
ability_raw
 109,648 0.1096 0.6988 0.0000 0.0000 5.0988 
PI
power_raw
 109,648 0.7452 4.6533 0.0000 0.0000 33.7860 
PI
contributions_raw
 109,648 849 5,031 0.0000 0.0000 36,120 
PI
candidates
 109,648 0.0000 0.5344 -0.7664 -0.0791 3.5749 
PI
strength
 109,648 0.0000 1.0923 -1.4902 -0.1618 6.8934 
PI
ability
 109,648 0.0000 0.2502 -0.2637 -0.0341 1.8501 
PI
power
 109,648 0.0000 0.5099 -0.7915 -0.0626 3.5512 
PI
contributions
 109,648 0.0000 1.7807 -2.6117 -0.2855 10.4371 
Panel A.2: Political contributions (Contributors only) 
PI
candidates_raw
 7,424 94.9964 109 1.0000 51.5000 698 
PI
strength_raw
 6,643 2,741 4,316 14.5175 1008 40,207 
PI
ability_raw
 5,847 9.1879 6.0931 0.0220 7.9602 64.0839 
PI
power_raw
 6,615 394 374 2.3587 258 2,062 
PI
contributions_raw
 7,371 64,698 127,607 30.0000 21,600 2,077,800 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Market value 109,648 1,950 6,101 0.7673 186 43,616 
Equity value 109,648 1,323 4,011 0.3250 130 27,305 
B/M 109,648 0.7143 0.7134 0.0186 0.5290 4.7282 
Leverage 109,648 0.2011 0.1936 0.0000 0.1572 0.9848 
Cash flows 109,648 0.2381 34.6687 -690 0.0560 6,569 
Cash reserves 109,648 0.1829 0.2450 -0.5317 0.0802 7.9991 
ROA 106,676 0.0055 0.2005 -0.7268 0.0491 0.3964 
Sales growth 109,648 0.2743 0.9458 -0.9860 0.0925 7.5347 
Net loss 109,648 0.3295 0.4700 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Geographic diversification 92,190 0.1386 6.5354 -8.4960 -1.4818 30.4661 
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Table 1 – (continued) 
 
Descriptive statistics. 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Panel C: Bid characteristics 
Horizontal deal 4,396 0.6558 0.4752 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Cash payment 4,396 0.3041 0.4601 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Tender offer 4,395 0.1836 0.3872 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hostile deal 4,395 0.0564 0.2308 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Competing deal 4,396 0.0532 0.2245 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
US bidder 4,396 0.8769 0.3286 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Relative deal size 3,634 0.3222 0.4402 0.0010 0.1550 2.5501 
Time to completion 3,761 134 80.9827 20.0000 118 481 
Takeover premium 4,028 0.4587 0.3767 0.0000 0.3669 2.0000 
Panel D: M&A market characteristics 
Industry M&A liquidity 109,510 0.0548 0.1256 0.0000 0.0108 0.8799 
Herfindahl index 109,510 0.1713 0.1522 0.0142 0.1208 1.0000 
Merger wave 109,648 0.3125 0.4635 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 2 
 
Comparisons of political contributions and firm characteristics between acquired and non-
acquired firms.  
 
This table compares the mean values of the variables for the sub-samples of acquired firms and firms that are not 
acquired. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) Acquired firms (2) Non-acquired firms (2) – (1) 
N 3,761 105,887  
Panel A.1: Political contributions 
PI
candidates_raw
 0.3260 0.8421 0.5161*** 
PI
strength_raw
 11.5629 27.6114 16.0485*** 
PI
ability_raw
 0.0522 0.1116 0.0594*** 
PI
power_raw
 0.2753 0.7619 0.4866*** 
PI
contributions_raw
 329 867 538*** 
Panel A.2: Political contributions (Contributors only) 
PI
candidates_raw
 78.2889 95.5185 17.2297*** 
PI
strength_raw
 2080 2762 683*** 
PI
ability_raw
 9.4690 9.1794 -0.2896 
PI
power_raw
 343 396 52.6347** 
PI
contributions_raw
 45,527 65,294 19,767*** 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Market value 1,476 1,966 491*** 
Equity value 953 1,336 383*** 
B/M  0.6772 0.7157 0.0385*** 
Leverage 0.1874 0.2016 0.0142*** 
Cash flows -0.00003 0.2465 0.2466** 
Cash reserves 0.1871 0.1827 -0.0044 
ROA 0.0084 0.0054 -0.0029 
Sales growth 0.2795 0.2741 -0.0053 
Net loss 0.3026 0.3304 0.0278*** 
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Table 3 
 
Politicians’ chance for re-election and ability to attract PAC contributions after merger deals.  
 
Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of the probit model in which the dependent variable, Re-election, takes the 
value of 1 if the politician is re-elected in the following election and 0 otherwise. # of Connected targets (acquirers) 
= the number of connected target firms (acquirers). # of Connected targets (acquirers) with completed deal = the 
number of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is completed. # of Connected targets (acquirers) with failed 
deal = the number of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is failed. Total size of connected target firms 
(acquirers) = the sum of total assets of connected target firms (acquirers). Total size of connected targets (acquirers) 
with completed deal = the sum of total assets of connected target firms (acquirers) whose deal is completed. Total 
size of connected target firms (acquirers) with failed deal = the sum of total assets of connected target firms 
(acquirers) whose deal is failed. Connections between politicians and target firms (acquirers) are determined by 
political action committee (PAC) contributions. Senator = 1 for a Senator and 0 for a House Representative. 
Democrat = 1 for a Democratic politician and 0 for a Republican politician. Aligned = 1 if the politician is in the 
same party as the President, and 0 otherwise. Ideology distance = the ratio of the ideology distance from the 
opposite party average to the ideology distance from the own party average. Age = politician’s age. Total PAC 
contributions = the total amount of PAC contributions in the year of the merger deal. # of connected firms = the 
number of firms connected to the politician via PAC contribution. State corruption = the number of conviction 
divided by state population in millions. PAI = the state-level political alignment index as in Kim et al. (2012). The 
variables # of connected target firms (acquirers), # of connected target firms (acquirers) with completed deal, # of 
connected target firms (acquirers) with failed deal, Total size of connected target firms (acquirers), Total size of 
connected target firms (acquirers) with completed deal, Total size of connected target firms (acquirers) with failed 
deal, age, law, total PAC contributions, and # of connected firms are transformed by adding one and taking the 
natural log. Panel B reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS model in which the dependent variable, Total PAC 
contributions in the following year, is the log-transformed total amount of PAC contributions in the next year of the 
merger deal. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
politician clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 – (continued) 
 
Politicians’ chance for re-election and ability to attract PAC contributions after merger deals.  
 
Panel A: Probability of getting re-elected after merger deals 
 Dependent variable =  
Re-election 
 
All deals 
Completed vs.  
Failed deals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
# of Connected target firms -1.0108***    
 (-18.68)    
# of Connected acquirers 0.2193***    
 (7.37)    
Total size of connected target firms  -0.0385***   
  (-16.42)   
Total size of connected acquirers  0.0068***   
  (2.92)   
# of Connected target firms with completed deal   -1.6820***  
   (-21.03)  
# of Connected target firms with failed deal   -0.2562***  
   (-3.37)  
# of Connected acquirers with completed deal   0.2812***  
   (9.11)  
# of Connected acquirers with failed deal   -0.1972***  
   (-4.14)  
Total size of connected target firms with completed deal    -0.0611*** 
    (-20.51) 
Total size of connected target firms with failed deal    -0.0101*** 
    (-3.37) 
Total size of connected acquirers with completed deal    0.0063*** 
    (2.66) 
Total size of connected acquirers with failed deal    -0.0096*** 
    (-4.26) 
Senator 0.2289*** 0.1794*** 0.2923*** 0.2278*** 
 (3.33) (2.73) (3.89) (3.21) 
Democrat -0.1329*** -0.1534*** -0.1210** -0.1408*** 
 (-2.84) (-3.34) (-2.46) (-2.90) 
Aligned -0.0724 -0.0617 -0.0953* -0.0762 
 (-1.27) (-1.09) (-1.67) (-1.34) 
Ideology distance -0.0606** -0.0616** -0.0669** -0.0582* 
 (-2.01) (-2.10) (-2.14) (-1.92) 
Age -0.8651*** -0.8979*** -0.8757*** -0.9909*** 
 (-5.92) (-6.26) (-5.70) (-6.41) 
Total PAC contributions -0.3869*** -0.3600*** -0.4038*** -0.3569*** 
 (-10.23) (-10.32) (-10.00) (-9.85) 
# of connected firms 0.4984*** 0.5256*** 0.5303*** 0.5748*** 
 (25.07) (26.50) (25.74) (26.84) 
State corruption -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0111 -0.0071 
 (-0.51) (-0.41) (-0.95) (-0.61) 
PAI -0.2389** -0.2428** -0.2243* -0.2276** 
 (-2.05) (-2.11) (-1.91) (-1.96) 
Constant 7.6747*** 7.6276*** 7.8211*** 7.9238*** 
 (10.63) (10.88) (10.29) (10.57) 
N 7,525 7,525 7,525 7,525 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2530 0.2353 0.2987 0.2853 
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Table 3 – (continued) 
 
Politicians’ chance for re-election and ability to attract PAC contributions after merger deals.  
 
Panel B: Politicians’ ability to attract PAC contributions after merger deals 
 Dependent variable =  
Total PAC contributions in the following year 
 
All deals 
Completed vs.  
Failed deals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
# of Connected target firms 0.0967***    
 (5.75)    
# of Connected acquirers 0.5946***    
 (29.57)    
Total size of connected target firms  0.0123***   
  (13.15)   
Total size of connected acquirers  0.0395***   
  (17.81)   
# of Connected target firms with completed deal   0.0007  
   (0.03)  
# of Connected target firms with failed deal   0.1288***  
   (6.07)  
# of Connected acquirers with completed deal   0.5626***  
   (27.14)  
# of Connected acquirers with failed deal   0.1483***  
   (9.07)  
Total size of connected target firms with completed deal    0.0049*** 
    (3.98) 
Total size of connected target firms with failed deal    0.0108*** 
    (11.02) 
Total size of connected acquirers with completed deal    0.0373*** 
    (16.99) 
Total size of connected acquirers with failed deal    0.0108*** 
    (11.68) 
Senator 0.0304 0.0830** 0.0195 0.0749** 
 (0.91) (2.33) (0.58) (2.18) 
Democrat -0.0308 -0.0864*** -0.0278 -0.0703*** 
 (-1.24) (-3.28) (-1.12) (-2.72) 
Aligned 0.0142 0.0153 0.0101 0.0069 
 (0.70) (0.73) (0.50) (0.33) 
Ideology distance -0.0213 -0.0163 -0.0204 -0.0196 
 (-1.26) (-0.96) (-1.22) (-1.19) 
Age 0.1572** 0.0253 0.1615** 0.0399 
 (2.26) (0.34) (2.32) (0.55) 
Total PAC contributions 0.2612*** 0.3038*** 0.2606*** 0.2966*** 
 (13.41) (15.89) (13.25) (15.41) 
# of connected firms 0.2210*** 0.3249*** 0.2247*** 0.3053*** 
 (14.01) (17.10) (14.25) (16.80) 
State corruption 0.0093* 0.0083 0.0094* 0.0089* 
 (1.87) (1.59) (1.89) (1.72) 
PAI 0.1123*** 0.0766* 0.1111*** 0.0752* 
 (2.87) (1.86) (2.84) (1.86) 
Constant 5.4411*** 5.2895*** 5.4753*** 5.3669*** 
 (17.63) (15.65) (17.74) (16.33) 
N 7,415 7,415 7,415 7,415 
Pseudo R-squared 0.5812 0.5262 0.5801 0.5360 
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Table 4 
 
Employment change in the politician’s district.  
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Employment 
change, is calculated as the percentage change in the total number of employees in the politician’s district between 
year y and year y+1. Total size (sales, # of employees) of acquired firms in the politician’s district = total size (sales, 
number of employees) of acquired firms in the politician’s district in year y. Democrat = 1 if the district’s politician 
is Democratic and 0 otherwise. Aligned = 1 if the district’s politician is in the same party as the President, and 0 
otherwise. State corruption = the number of convictions divided by state population in millions. The variables Total 
size (sales, # of employees) of acquired firms in the politician’s district, and state population are transformed by 
adding one and taking the natural log. Year and state-district fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are 
based on calendar year dummies and state-district dummies, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and state-district clustering. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. 
 
 Dependent variable =  
Employment change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Total size of acquired firms in the politician’s district -0.0059***   
 (-2.94)   
Total sales of acquired firms in the politician’s district  -0.0048***  
  (-3.06)  
Total # of employees of acquired firms in the politician’s district   -0.0095*** 
   (-3.22) 
Democrat -0.0164 -0.0164 -0.0162 
 (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.48) 
Aligned -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0046 
 (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.62) 
State corruption 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
State population 0.0186*** 0.0161*** 0.0180*** 
 (3.93) (3.19) (3.74) 
Constant 0.0002 -0.0903*** -0.0997*** 
 (0.00) (-2.71) (-2.85) 
    
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes 
State-district-fixed Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 4,404 4,404 4,404 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1339 0.1336 0.1351 
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Table 5 
 
Comparisons of the probability of being acquired between politically connected and non-
connected firms.  
 
This table compares the probability of being acquired between politically connected and non-connected firms. In 
panel A, we compare the probability in a univariate test. In panel B, we use the probit model that regresses on the 
political connection dummy and other controlling variables used in Table 6, where the political connection dummy 
is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm presents non-zero values in any of the political contribution 
variables (PI
candidates_raw
, PI
strength_raw
, PI
ability_raw
, PI
power_raw
, and PI
contributions_raw
) and 0 otherwise. Refer to Appendix 
A for detailed variable descriptions.  
 
Panel A: Univariate test of being acquired 
 (1) 
Firms with political 
connections 
(2) 
Firms with no political 
connections 
Acquired 59 3,702 
Not acquired 4,535 101,352 
Total 4,594 105,054 
Probability of being acquired 1.28% 3.52% 
% change 
[(1)-(2)]/(2)] 
-63.56% 
Panel B: Multivariate test of being acquired 
 (1) 
Firms with political 
connections 
(2) 
Firms with no political 
connections 
Probability of being acquired 0.77% 2.71% 
% change 
[(1)-(2)]/(2)] 
-71.59% 
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Table 6 
 
Probability of being acquired.  
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the probit model. The dependent variable, Acquired, is an indicator 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. Political contribution variables are the firm size-
orthogonal measures. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Year, industry, and state fixed effects, 
whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year dummies, Fama-French 49 industry classification 
dummies, and state dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The z-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = Acquired 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PI
candidates
 -0.1643***     
 (-7.16)     
PI
strength
  -0.0771***    
  (-7.05)    
PI
ability
   -0.2399***   
   (-5.31)   
PI
power
    -0.1413***  
    (-6.54)  
PI
contributions
     -0.0518*** 
     (-8.10) 
Market value 0.0132*** 0.0135*** 0.0152*** 0.0147*** 0.0130*** 
 (2.97) (3.05) (3.52) (3.36) (2.94) 
B/M 0.0325*** 0.0322*** 0.0306** 0.0317*** 0.0327*** 
 (2.74) (2.71) (2.58) (2.67) (2.75) 
Leverage 0.0461 0.0458 0.0473 0.0470 0.0453 
 (0.99) (0.99) (1.02) (1.01) (0.98) 
Cash flows -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
 (-2.27) (-2.28) (-2.23) (-2.25) (-2.27) 
Cash reserves 0.0440 0.0423 0.0394 0.0412 0.0408 
 (1.20) (1.16) (1.11) (1.13) (1.12) 
ROA 0.1409** 0.1424*** 0.1456*** 0.1462*** 0.1402** 
 (2.56) (2.59) (2.65) (2.66) (2.55) 
Sales growth -0.0214*** -0.0213*** -0.0203** -0.0210** -0.0216*** 
 (-2.60) (-2.59) (-2.48) (-2.55) (-2.62) 
Net loss 0.0198 0.0200 0.0196 0.0197 0.0196 
 (0.87) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) 
Industry M&A liquidity 1.0065*** 1.0071*** 1.0064*** 1.0122*** 1.0068*** 
 (7.71) (7.71) (7.71) (7.75) (7.71) 
Herfindahl index -0.7661** -0.7613** -0.7706** -0.7598** -0.7688** 
 (-2.23) (-2.22) (-2.25) (-2.22) (-2.24) 
Merger wave 0.0687*** 0.0687*** 0.0685*** 0.0688*** 0.0686*** 
 (2.95) (2.95) (2.94) (2.95) (2.94) 
      
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 106,545 106,545 106,545 106,545 106,545 
χ2 
[Prob> χ2] 
1093.64 
[0.000] 
1092.46 
[0.000] 
1079.57 
[0.000] 
1093.28 
[0.000] 
1108.04 
[0.000] 
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Table 7 
 
Probability of being acquired: a matching-firm approach.  
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the conditional logit regression. For each target, five pseudo target 
firms are matched by the Fama-French 49 industries, market value, B/M, and 1-year previous stock return. The 
dependent variable, Acquired, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. 
Political contribution variables are the firm size-orthogonal measures. The control variables are the same as the ones 
used in Table 6. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. We also include a fixed effect for each 
bidder and its control target firms, i.e., a deal fixed effect. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Dependent variable = Acquired 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PI
candidates
 -0.4776***     
 (-5.90)     
PI
strength
  -0.2331***    
  (-5.88)    
PI
ability
   -0.5649***   
   (-4.34)   
PI
power
    -0.3917***  
    (-5.41)  
PI
contributions
     -0.1655*** 
     (-6.72) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 17,693 17,693 17,693 17,693 17,693 
χ2 
[Prob> χ2] 
312.98 
[0.000] 
311.90 
[0.000] 
296.58 
[0.000] 
305.42 
[0.000] 
321.67 
[0.000] 
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Table 8  
 
Two-stage instrumental variable and Heckman selection models.  
 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated coefficients of the two-stage model regression. In the first-stage, a probit 
model estimates PI indicator, which takes the value of 1 if the firm presents non-zero values in any of the political 
contribution variables (PI
candidates_raw
, PI
strength_raw
, PI
ability_raw
, PI
power_raw
, and PI
contributions_raw
) and 0 otherwise. 
Geographic diversification is measured based on the number of economically relevant states, developed by Garcia 
and Norli (2012). We take the residual value from the regression of the number of states on Ln(total sales+1). The 
second-stage model uses the fitted value of PI indicator to estimate Acquired, an indicator that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients of the Heckman selection model. 
The control variables are the same as the ones used in Table 6. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year dummies. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Two-stage model Heckman selection 
Dependent variable = PI indicator Acquired Acquired 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PI indicator   -0.5632*** 
   (-8.54) 
Instrumented PI indicator  -2.9140***  
  (-3.58)  
Geographic diversification 0.0122***   
 (4.98)   
Inverse Mills ratio   4.2150*** 
   (3.22) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 84,079 84,079 84,079 
χ2 
[Prob> χ2] 
1092.68 
[0.000] 
511.08 
[0.000] 
580.59 
[0.000] 
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Table 9 
 
Difference-in-difference test with Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). 
 
This table reports the difference-in-difference test results. The dependent variable, Acquired, is an indicator that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. Treat (PI) = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the PI
raw
 is greater than 0, 
where PI
raw
 = one of the five political contribution variables: 1) PI
candidates_raw
, 2) PI
strength_raw
, 3) PI
ability_raw
, 4) PI
power_raw
, and 5) 
PI
contributions_raw
. Bipartisan = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 5-year period (2003-2007) after the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act became effective in 2002, and 0 for the 5-year period (1997-2001) before the BCRA became effective. 
The control variables are the same as the ones used in Table 6. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Year, 
industry, and state fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year dummies, Fama-French 49 
industry classification dummies, and state dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. *** and 
** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treat (PI
candidates
) -0.0382***     
 (-9.56)     
Treat (PI
strength
)  -0.0407***    
  (-10.52)    
Treat (PI
ability
)   -0.0379***   
   (-9.22)   
Treat (PI
power
)    -0.0372***  
    (-8.41)  
Treat (PI
contributions
)     -0.0382*** 
     (-9.56) 
Bipartisan -0.0074** -0.0073** -0.0072** -0.0070* -0.0074** 
 (-2.04) (-2.02) (-2.00) (-1.94) (-2.04) 
Treat (PI
candidates
) * Bipartisan 0.0149***     
 (3.02)     
Treat (PI
strength
) * Bipartisan  0.0159***    
  (3.28)    
Treat (PI
ability
) * Bipartisan   0.0207***   
   (3.42)   
Treat (PI
power
) * Bipartisan    0.0158***  
    (2.81)  
Treat (PI
contributions
) * Bipartisan     0.0149*** 
     (3.02) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 57,612 57,612 57,612 57,612 57,612 
R-squared 0.0108 0.0108 0.0104 0.0105 0.0108 
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Table 10 
 
Time to completion.  
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regressions of time to completion. The dependent variable, Time to completion, is 
computed as the number of days from the acquisition announcement to completion date. Political contribution variables are the firm size-
orthogonal measures. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Year, industry, and state fixed effects, whose coefficients 
are suppressed, are based on calendar year dummies, Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, and state dummies, respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = Time to completion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PI
candidates
 12.1201**     
 (2.18)     
PI
strength
  5.2742**    
  (1.99)    
PI
ability
   22.6988**   
   (2.02)   
PI
power
    10.3433*  
    (1.87)  
PI
contributions
     4.3597*** 
     (2.64) 
Market value 5.3563*** 5.2809*** 5.1382*** 5.1871*** 5.4885*** 
 (5.52) (5.47) (5.45) (5.43) (5.66) 
B/M 5.1407** 5.1626** 5.1550** 5.1966** 5.1370** 
 (2.43) (2.44) (2.44) (2.45) (2.43) 
Leverage -11.3793 -11.4064 -11.6793 -11.4476 -11.0603 
 (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.44) (-1.41) (-1.36) 
Cash flows 1.6271 1.6031 1.5842 1.6494 1.6631 
 (1.59) (1.57) (1.55) (1.60) (1.62) 
Cash reserves -37.6278*** -37.4398*** -37.7756*** -37.4029*** -37.3380*** 
 (-5.56) (-5.53) (-5.57) (-5.53) (-5.53) 
ROA -20.8643** -20.9083** -20.8015** -21.0621** -20.9048** 
 (-2.29) (-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.31) (-2.29) 
Sales growth -0.9831 -1.0067 -1.0051 -0.9984 -0.9678 
 (-0.68) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.67) 
Net loss 5.3992 5.3792 5.3873 5.5091 5.4310 
 (1.57) (1.56) (1.56) (1.60) (1.58) 
Horizontal deal 0.5121 0.5035 0.4693 0.5224 0.5132 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) 
Cash payment -18.0759*** -18.0727*** -17.9728*** -18.1990*** -18.0842*** 
 (-6.01) (-6.00) (-5.97) (-6.05) (-6.01) 
Tender offer -42.5399*** -42.6199*** -42.6901*** -42.5348*** -42.4391*** 
 (-13.86) (-13.88) (-13.90) (-13.86) (-13.81) 
Hostile deal 63.4500*** 63.4922*** 63.8573*** 62.8407*** 62.9710*** 
 (3.91) (3.91) (3.94) (3.85) (3.86) 
Competing deal 39.3982*** 39.3391*** 40.7382*** 38.2334*** 38.2400*** 
 (2.83) (2.83) (2.94) (2.73) (2.72) 
US bidder -3.1593 -3.1710 -3.0980 -3.1649 -3.1898 
 (-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.96) 
Industry M&A liquidity 18.3687 18.2288 19.2023 18.2507 18.0119 
 (0.88) (0.87) (0.92) (0.88) (0.86) 
Herfindahl index 61.0180 58.7845 60.3164 62.5673 62.3325 
 (1.22) (1.18) (1.21) (1.25) (1.24) 
Merger wave -0.7285 -0.7124 -0.8472 -0.7785 -0.5699 
 (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.17) 
      
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
R-squared 0.3430 0.3426 0.3427 0.3424 0.3440 
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Table 11  
 
Takeover premium. 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regressions of takeover premium. The dependent variable, Takeover 
premium, is computed as the difference between the offer price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the 
acquisition announcement divided by the latter. Target firms’ political contribution variables are the firm size-orthogonal 
measures. Bidder’s PI indicator = a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder’s PI is greater than 0, and 
zero otherwise, where PI = one of the five political contribution variables. The control variables are the same as the ones 
used in Table 10. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Industry and state fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies and state dummies, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable = Takeover premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PI
candidates
 0.0677***     
 (2.70)     
PI
strength
  0.0336***    
  (2.73)    
PI
ability
   0.0905**   
   (2.18)   
PI
power
    0.0854***  
    (3.31)  
PI
contributions
     0.0208*** 
     (2.96) 
Bidder’s PIcandidates indicator 0.0305     
 (1.39)     
Bidder’s PIstrength indicator  0.0401*    
  (1.74)    
Bidder’s PIability indicator   0.0404   
   (1.51)   
Bidder’s PIpower indicator    0.0330  
    (1.42)  
Bidder’s PIcontributions indicator     0.0301 
     (1.37) 
PI
candidates
 * Bidder’s PIcandidates indicator -0.0612**     
 (-2.19)     
PI
strength
 * Bidder’s PIstrength indicator  -0.0275**    
  (-2.00)    
PI
ability
 * Bidder’s PIability indicator   -0.0850*   
   (-1.71)   
PI
power
 * Bidder’s PIpower indicator    -0.0760***  
    (-2.64)  
PI
contributions
 * Bidder’s PIcontributions indicator     -0.0195** 
     (-2.38) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 2,855 2,855 2,855 2,855 2,855 
R-squared 0.1309 0.1312 0.1299 0.1316 0.1311 
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Table 12 
 
Lobbying expenditures and M&A deals. 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of lobbying expenditures, while Panel B compares the mean values of 
lobbying expenditures for the sub-samples of firms that were acquired and firms that were not acquired. Panel C 
compares the probability of being acquired. In panel C.1, we compare the probability in a univariate test. In panel 
C.2, we use the probit model that regresses the probability of being acquired on the lobbying expenditures dummy 
and other control variables used in Table 6, where the lobbying expenditures dummy is an indicator that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm presents any lobbying expenditures and 0 otherwise. In Panel D, column (1) is the probit model 
to estimate the probability of being Acquired, an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 
otherwise. Column (2) reports the result using a matching-firm approach. For each target, five pseudo target firms 
are matched by the Fama-French 49 industries, market value, B/M, and 1-year previous stock return. Columns (3) 
and (4) report the estimated coefficients of the two-stage model regressions. In the first-stage, a probit model 
estimates lobbying indicator, which takes the value of 1 if a firm’s lobbying expenditures are greater than 0. 
Geographic diversification is measured based on the number of economically relevant states, developed by Garcia 
and Norli (2012). We take the residual value from the regression of the number of states on Ln(total sales+1). The 
second-stage model uses the fitted value of lobbying indicator to estimate Acquired. Column (5) reports the 
estimated coefficients of the Heckman selection model. Column (6) reports the difference-in-difference test result. 
Abramoff = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 5-year period (2007-2011) after the Abramoff’s 
scandal in 2006, and 0 for the 5-year period (2001-2005) before the scandal. Column (7) is used to estimate the 
results for the time to completion. Column (8) estimates the results for the takeover premium. Acquired is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm is acquired and 0 otherwise. Time to completion is computed as the 
number of days from the acquisition announcement to completion date. Takeover premium is computed as the 
difference between the offer price and the target firm’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement 
divided by the latter. In the regressions, lobbying expenditures is the firm size-orthogonal measure. Bidder’s 
lobbying indicator = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder’s lobbying expenditures are greater 
than 0. The control variables in columns (1) to (6) are the same as the ones used in Table 6, while the control 
variables in columns (7) and (8) are the same as the ones used in Table 10. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year, industry, and state fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year 
dummies, Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, and state dummies, respectively. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The z-statistics and t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 – (continued) 
 
Lobbying expenditures and M&A deals. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of lobbying expenditures 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
All sample 
Lobbying expenditures
raw
 68,068 $62,835 $283,290 $0 $0 $1,910,000 
Lobbying expenditures 68,068 0.0000 3.6610 -6.3850 -0.9348 15.9087 
Lobbying firms only 
Lobbying expenditures
raw
  8,016 $1,180,573 $11,472,450 $2,000 $200,000 $994,597,000 
 
Panel B: Comparisons of lobbying expenditures 
(1) Targets (2) No targets (2) – (1) 
All sample 
$44,700 $63,464 $18,764*** 
Lobbying firms only 
$696,313 $1,193,728 $497,415*** 
 
 
Panel C.1: Univariate test of being acquired 
 (1) 
Firms with lobbying  
expenditures 
(2) 
Firms with no lobbying 
expenditures 
Acquired 212 2,070 
Not Acquired 7,804 57,982 
Total 8,016 60,052 
Probability of being acquired 2.64% 3.45% 
% change 
[(1)-(2)]/(2)] 
-23.28% 
Panel C.2: Multivariate test of being acquired 
 
(1) 
Firms with lobbying expenditures 
(2) 
Firms with no lobbying 
expenditures 
Probability of being acquired 2.08% 2.76% 
% change 
[(1)-(2)]/(2)] 
-24.64% 
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Table 12 – (continued) 
 
Lobbying expenditures and M&A deals. 
 
Panel D: Regression analysis 
  
Matching-
firm 
Two-stage model 
Heckman 
selection 
Difference-
in-difference 
  
Dependent variable =   Acquired Acquired 
Lobbing 
indicator 
Acquired Acquired Acquired 
Time to 
completion 
Takeover 
premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lobbying expenditures -0.0106*** -0.0255**     1.0644** 0.0074** 
 (-3.70) (-2.56)     (2.00) (2.43) 
Lobbying indicator     -0.1519*** -0.0108***   
     (-4.07) (-3.72)   
Instrumented lobbying indicator    -2.0373***     
    (-3.20)     
Bidder’s lobbying indicator        -0.0007 
        (-0.03) 
Lob. expend. * Bid. lob. indicator        -0.0077* 
        (-1.84) 
Abramoff      -0.0153***   
      (-4.72)   
Lobbying indicator * Abramoff      0.0071*   
      (1.84)   
Geographic diversification   0.0086***      
   (4.32)      
Inverse Mills ratio     3.1992***    
     (3.06)    
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry-fixed Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Deal-fixed No Yes No No No No No No 
         
N 67,128 11,069 59,062 59,062 59,062 49,590 2,069 2,247 
Pseudo R-squared (R-squared) 0.0381 0.0632 0.2224 0.0234 0.0244 (0.0092) (0.3890) (0.1522) 
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Table 13 
 
Bidder’s analysis. 
 
This table provides the main regressions for bidding firms. Regressions (1) and (3) are the probit models to estimate the results for the 
probability of acquiring a target firm. Regressions (2) and (4) are used to estimate the results for the time to completion. Acquiring is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm acquires a target firm and 0 otherwise. Time to completion is computed as the number of days 
from the acquisition announcement to completion date. Bidder’s PI indicator = a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder’s 
PI is greater than 0, and zero otherwise, where PI = one of the five political contribution variables. Bidder’s lobbying indicator = a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the bidder’s lobbying expenditures are greater than 0. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions. Year, industry, and state fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year dummies, Fama-French 
49 industry classification dummies, and state dummies, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. The z-
statistics and t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Political contributions Lobbying expenditures 
Dependent variable = Acquiring Time to completion Acquiring Time to completion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bidder’s PI indicator 0.1235*** 7.5866   
 (2.73) (1.34)   
Bidder’s lobbying indicator   0.1174*** 11.6254** 
   (3.38) (2.30) 
Bidder’s market value 0.2298*** -2.0347* 0.2372*** -3.7564*** 
 (32.21) (-1.86) (27.17) (-2.86) 
Bidder’s B/M -0.0069 -2.0325 0.0218 -3.8291 
 (-0.31) (-0.51) (0.91) (-0.82) 
Bidder’s leverage -0.3047*** 5.6266 -0.3632*** 6.0719 
 (-4.84) (0.52) (-4.51) (0.47) 
Bidder’s cash flows -0.0010*** 0.8863 -0.0012*** -1.0435 
 (-2.98) (0.38) (-2.78) (-0.54) 
Bidder’s cash reserves -0.0716* -14.4691*** -0.0757* -7.7423* 
 (-1.96) (-3.24) (-1.90) (-1.82) 
Bidder’s ROA -0.1400* -16.1869 -0.1967** 7.4349 
 (-1.67) (-0.94) (-1.98) (0.38) 
Bidder’s sales growth 0.0137 -2.6243 -0.0038 -2.0563 
 (1.40) (-1.41) (-0.30) (-0.91) 
Bidder’s net loss -0.0927*** 5.2652 -0.1213*** 1.2758 
 (-3.06) (0.94) (-3.20) (0.20) 
Horizontal deal  7.3896**  6.3463 
  (2.30)  (1.52) 
Cash payment  -20.1450***  -22.7929*** 
  (-5.51)  (-5.50) 
Tender offer  -41.0855***  -40.5856*** 
  (-10.20)  (-8.77) 
Hostile deal  75.4880***  117.2936*** 
  (3.46)  (3.57) 
Competing deal  13.9924**  5.8187 
  (2.45)  (0.88) 
Industry M&A liquidity 1.4469*** 88.5031** 0.9281*** 89.6791** 
 (5.81) (2.56) (2.90) (2.22) 
Herfindahl index -0.1989 95.9377 -1.2755 127.3727 
 (-0.42) (1.49) (-1.53) (0.88) 
Merger wave 0.0016 -1.6139 0.0417 0.6163 
 (0.06) (-0.40) (1.17) (0.12) 
     
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 108,015 2,545 67,808 1,609 
Pseudo R-squared (R-squared) 0.1546 (0.3328) 0.1631 (0.3725) 
 
